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‘[Y]ou are imprisoning a man when he has not broken any written law, or when 
you cannot be sure of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he has done so. You are 
restricting his liberty, and making him suffer materially and spiritually, for what you 
think he intends to do, or is trying to do, or for what you believe he has done. Few 
things are more dangerous to the freedom of a society than that.’1  
         






 ‘There is no doubt that the events of September 11 created a new concept of 
democracy that differs from the concept that Western states defended before these 
events, to the freedom of the individual.’2  
 
Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, December 2001 
 
 
                                                 
1 Nyerere Freedom and unity: Uhuru na umoja: a selection from writings and speeches, 1952-65 (1967) 
312. 
2 Cited in Human Rights Watch In the name of counter-terrorism: human rights abuses worldwide, A 
Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human 





Much has been written on the infringement of civil liberties in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001. Unsurprisingly, the biggest amount of literature 
can be found about the measures advanced by the USA. Commentators explained, 
defended or condemned the steps taken and tried to prove their effectiveness or 
inadequacy. However, hardly any attention has been paid to another important aspect 
touching on general international law and international human rights law in 
particular:3 What is the effect of counter-terrorist actions on existing rules of human 
rights law when these actions violate these norms? Could they possibly create a new 
rule? 
 
The thesis will look at this neglected aspect of the ‘war on terrorism’ with focus on 
the troublesome practice of designating persons terrorists and detaining them without 
trial. A look at the current state of international law reveals that such detention without 
trial is prohibited under human rights law and humanitarian law. Nevertheless, states 
across the world have adopted this ‘crown jewel of [e]mergency measures’.4 The 
question of how states justify their approach in order to get around the prohibition 
arises. And could the practice together with its justification provide the basis for the 
emergence of a new rule of international law? 
 
The approach taken in this thesis will firstly establish the existing rules, secondly 
examine state practice in contravention of the existing rules and thirdly analyse the 
effect of this contravention on the existing rules. 
 
The first part will look at the rights of ‘terrorists’ with regard to detention without 
trial. For a start, detention without trial is defined briefly and the problems caused by 
this practice are identified. Then, relevant norms of human rights and humanitarian law 
                                                 
3 Cf Roberts ‘Righting wrongs or wronging rights? The United States and human rights post-September 
11’ (2004) 15 European J of International L 721. 
4 Hor ‘Law and terror: Singapore stories and Malaysian dilemmas’ in Ramraj, Hor and Roach Global 
anti-terrorism law and policy (2005) 277. 
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are highlighted to establish the existing rules regarding detention without trial and 
terrorism. Only norms of binding force will be considered, because non-binding soft-
law cannot be breached and therefore is irrelevant for the examination of this thesis.  
 
The second part examines the post 9/11-approaches of three states. According to 
the maxim ‘watch the ones who care’,5 these include the USA and the UK as the two 
leading powers in the ‘war on terrorism’ and Israel which has always been under heavy 
‘terrorist fire’. The approaches are analyzed in terms of what legislation was adopted 
and what actually happened. Following this analysis the justification of the practice is 
highlighted to see how states tried to circumvent conflicting norms of international 
law. Finally, the judiciary’s view is scrutinised, because this branch of government 
states what the law is. Judgments may reinforce or contradict the opinio iuris 
expressed by the executive. The case studies are complemented by a brief survey of 
other states practices. 
 
The repeated disregard for existing rules may give rise to change in international 
law. Therefore, the third and last part focuses on the possibility that state practice 
together with its justification might foster the emergence of a new or altered rule of 
international law. After revisiting mechanisms of creation and change of norms in 
customary international law, the particular effects of the detention practices are 
discussed. Other governments’ as well as courts’ reactions are given account in order 








                                                 
5 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FR Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands) 1969 ICJ Rep 43. 
Cf also Stern ‘Custom at the heart of international law’ (2001) 11 Duke J of Comparative and 




2. Detention without trial and rights of ‘terrorists’ 
 
This chapter provides the basis for the following examination. First, it is necessary 
to reach a working definition of what is meant by detention without trial. Closely 
connected are the problems raised by this practice. Following this theoretical 
groundwork the international law on detention without trial is established. For this 
purpose, universal, regional and customary norms of international human rights law 
are scrutinized, followed by norms of international humanitarian law.  
 
A definition of terrorism will not be attempted. Firstly, states still struggle to find a 
common denominator regarding a legal definition of terrorism, since it is a highly 
political term and an attempt to define terrorism could fill a thesis on its own.6 
Secondly, a general definition is not necessary within the purpose of this thesis, 
because it suffices to consider how individual states define ‘terrorists’. Hence, 
domestic approaches will be looked at briefly in the case studies. 
 
2.1. Definition 
Detention without trial is also referred to as administrative detention or preventive 
detention.7 The concept is defined in various ways that do not differ significantly.8 
However, to clarify what the thesis is dealing with, salient features are highlighted to 
illustrate the general understanding of such detention. Detention without trial is 
basically defined by three elements: What act is committed, who commits it and why 
is it committed? 
                                                 
6 See for an attempt of definition Cassese ‘Terrorism as an international crime’ in Bianchi Enforcing 
international law against terrorism (2004) 213-225. 
7 Gross ‘Human rights, terrorism and the problem of administrative detention in Israel: does a 
democracy have the right to hold terrorists as bargaining chips?’ (2001) 18 Arizona J of International 
and Comparative L 752. See also Ncube ‘Investigative detention distinguished from preventive 
detention: a distinction without a difference?’ (1987) 5 Zimbabwe LR 247 and Peter ‘Incarcerating the 
innocent: preventive detention in Tanzania’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Q 114. 
8 Cook ‘Preventive detention – international standards and the protection of the individual’ in 
Frankowski and Shelton (eds) Preventive detention: a comparative and international law perspective 
(1992) 1. See also Peter (1997) 114-15, Ncube (1987) 247 and Mahomed ‘Preventive detention and the 




The first element comprises the deprivation of an individual’s right to personal 
liberty,9 that is a person is locked up by the state. This may happen in a normal prison 
or in special detention facilities. The term ‘detention’ covers any state of deprivation of 
liberty, regardless of whether this was due to an arrest (custody, pre-trial detention), a 
conviction, abduction or any other act by the state.10  
 
Secondly, the executive is usually the sole actor. This means that the governmental 
branch of state power decides whether to detain.11 Such a decision is regularly 
rendered by high level executive officials such as the head of government or a 
minister. Furthermore, the executive also carries out the detention and decides on the 
release of the detainee. Hence, there is no trial or judicial oversight in the first place.  
 
Thirdly, usually no allegation of an offence is made, nor does an intention to 
charge, prosecute or punish the detainee exist.12 The bona fide rationale is to prevent 
an individual from doing harm to society and to avert the perceived threat posed by the 
person.13 It is a precautionary or anticipatory measure rather than punishment.14  
 
The perceived threat to the public may be due to various reasons, such as mental 
illness, vagrancy, illegal immigration or the spreading of infectious diseases.15 This 
thesis, however, will only deal with the potential danger created by persons suspected 
of involvement in terrorist activities. Hence, the practice which is reviewed here 
consists of the recent practice of labelling persons ‘terrorists’ and detaining them at the 
executive’s discretion. Persons need not necessarily be expressly called ‘terrorists’ to 
fall under this category. What is decisive is that the danger they pose is determined in 
                                                 
9 Cook (1992) 1. 
10 Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR commentary (1993) 169. 
11 Peter (1997) 114-15. 
12 Gross (2001) 753 and Ncube (1987) 247. 
13 Jayawickrama The judicial application of human rights law: national, regional and international 
jurisprudence (2002) 400. 
14 See Jayawickrama (2002) 400 and Gross (2001) 752. 
15 Cf Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by 
Protocol No 11, Rome, 4.XI 1950, European Treaty Series No 5 (EuCHR) art 5(e) and (f). See also 
Cook (1992) 1. 
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connection with the current ‘war against terrorism’, thus covering also constructs such 
as ‘special interest detainees’16 as well as ‘illegal combatants’.17  
 
2.2. The problem of detention without trial 
From a human rights perspective, the practice of detention without trial raises 
several serious concerns. The main problem of such administrative or preventive 
detention is the very grave encroachment on fundamental personal liberty without an 
objective test of the reasons therefore, namely the ‘dangerousness’ or potential 
threat.18 Failing a trial, which is bound to establish an objective ‘truth’ as far as 
possible, detention rather hinges on the highly subjective assessment of one or a few 
executive officials. Depending on the particular regime in place, detention may be 
based on reasonable suspicion that needs to be justified a posterior,19 but may also be 
based on mere instinct or opinion that cannot be challenged at all.20  
 
The highly subjective nature of such detention is aggravated by the fact that the 
decision maker – that is the executive official in charge – has a strong interest in the 
case, unlike a neutral and unbiased judge.21 The executive’s interest lies in public or 
state security rather than in the rights of particular individuals, especially in times of 
crisis. Abuse and careless usage of administrative detention are fostered by 
administrative convenience and political advantages, for example creating the public 
impression of acting against the problem of terrorism determinedly.22  
 
From a victim’s perspective, detention without trial causes serious concern with 
regard to the principle of legality. The executive’s power to detain might be granted by 
                                                 
16 US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General The September 11 detainees: a review of 
the treatment of aliens held on immigration charges in connection with the investigation of the 
September 11 attacks Special Report, (2003) 5. 
17 See Israel’s Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants law, 5762-2002 art 2. 
18 Mahomed (1989) 550. 
19 Jayawickrama (2002) 400-01. 
20 Peter (1997) 115 and Cook (1992) 11. 
21 Cf Mahomed (1989) 550. 
22 Cf Heymann Terrorism, freedom and security (2003) 94-95. See also Franck ‘Criminals, combatants, 
or what? An examination of the role of law in responding to the threat of terror’ (2004) 98 American J 
of International L 686-87 and Thomas ‘Emergency and anti-terrorist powers: 9/11: USA and UK’ 
(2003) 26 Fordham International LJ 1196. 
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statutory provisions rendering it perfectly legal in the first place.23 The prerequisites 
authorizing detention are generally couched in broad and vague terms like ‘national 
security’ while it is up to the executive official in charge to fill this gap by way of a 
subjective finding.24 As long as an objective finding of breach of law is not necessary, 
it is difficult if not impossible for individuals to determine what behaviour will keep 
them out of jail with certainty.25 This lack of predictability promotes arbitrariness and 
contradicts the basic principles of legality and certainty of law (Rechtssicherheit).26 
Illustrating in this regard is the ‘little old Swiss lady example’ whereby the US 
government acknowledged that ‘[a] little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to 
what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but really is a front to 
finance Al Qaeda activities’ might be subject to detention as an ‘enemy combatant’.27 
A person teaching the son of an Al Qaeda member English would likewise be eligible 
for such detention.28
 
Not only arbitrariness distinguishes detention without trial from criminal arrest. 
There is also a significant difference in the duration of confinement. While the period 
of imprisonment that has to be served after conviction is determined and known to the 
prisoner, administrative detention is often indefinite.29 This situation of indeterminacy 
tends to have strong detrimental effects on the health and psyche of detainees.30 
Furthermore, the prospect of being detained indefinitely at the whim of some state 
                                                 
23 Gross (2001) 773. 
24 Gross (2001) 773 and Cook (1992) 11. 
25 Cf Mahomed (1989) 551. 
26 The European Court of Human rights (EurCtHR) stated that ‘a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” 
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be 
able--if need be with appropriate advice--to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with 
absolute certainty.’ See Sunday Times v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, 271. See also Dinstein ‘The right 
to life, physical integrity, and liberty’ in Henkin (ed) The International Bill of Rights: the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1981) 129-30. 
27 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F Supp 2d 443, 475 (D DC 2005). See also Martinez 
‘Detention of suspected terrorists: balancing security and human rights’ (2004) Research paper, Stanford 
Law School 6. 
28 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F Supp 2d 475.
29 Gross (2001) 753. 
30 Cf G v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 WLR 1349, 1352. See also Walker 
‘Prisoners of war all the time’ (2005) 10 European Human Rights LR 69-70. 
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officials may rightly be interpreted as a violation of human dignity and some sort of 
inhuman and degrading treatment if not torture. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding such detentions is not only in itself a violation of 
human dignity, but also puts detainees in an especially vulnerable position.31 
Detainees who are left in a legal limbo are often exposed to harsh conditions and ill-
treatment.32 The lack of judicial control and oversight facilitates abuse by guards and 
fellow inmates alike, especially when detainees are stigmatized as threats to national 
security in times of crisis.33 Ill-treatment of detainees is furthermore employed as an 
interrogation technique, especially in the context of terrorism, with not only the 
detainee’s dignity at stake, but also his mere survival.34 The problem is far from 
confined to ill-reputed countries only, but exists also in the world’s most developed 
democracies.35  
 
2.3. International human rights norms on detention without trial 
The practice of detaining persons without trial described above interferes with one 
of the oldest human rights in history, the right to personal liberty.36 This right features 
in the array of rights protecting the individual against the state (Abwehrrechte). These 
rights put states under a negative obligation not to engage in proscribed conduct. They 
are also known as human rights of the first generation.  
 
                                                 
31 Rieter ‘ICCPR Case law on detention, the prohibition of cruel treatment and some issues pertaining to 
the death row phenomenon’ (2002) 1 J of the Institute of Justice & International Studies 86 and Cook 
(1992) 1. 
32 Cf Warbrick ‘The European response to terrorism in age of human rights’ (2004) 15 European J of 
International L 1015. 
33 See for example Human Rights Watch Presumption of guilt: human rights abuses of post-September 
11 detainees (2002b) HRW Report Vol 14 No 4 (G) 67-84. 
34 Neuman ‘Comment, counter-terrorist operations and the rule of law’ (2004) 15 European J of 
International L 1024-25. 
35 Flynn ‘Counter-terrorism and human rights: the view from the United Nations’ (2005) 10 European 
Human Rights LR 40-42. Cf also Rieter (2002) 83 and Human Rights Watch (2002b) 73-78. 
36 The right to personal liberty goes back to the Magna Charta Libertatum of 1215. See Nowak (1993) 
159, Dinstein (1981) 136 and Smith Textbook on international human rights (2005) 240. 
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2.3.1. Universal human rights law on detention: the ICCPR 
The major universal human rights treaty dealing with first generation rights is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 (ICCPR).37 
As a treaty it unfolds binding force towards its member states. Currently, 155 states are 
party to the ICCPR.38
 
The relevant substantive provision can be found in art 9 protecting the individual’s 
‘right to liberty and security of the person’.39 Liberty in this context must be 
interpreted narrowly delineating mere physical freedom,40 or freedom from ‘forceful 
detention […] at a certain, narrowly bounded location’.41 Hence, the right provides for 
a defence against being taken out of ordinary life and locked up in some confined area 
by the state. 
 
The right to liberty, however, is not absolute. Rather, curtailing this right is 
absolutely necessary for any society to function properly, because it presents the most 
important sanction for misbehaviour and non-conformity with the law.42 Given the 
progressive abandonment of the death penalty and of corporal punishment, the 
importance of imprisonment as punitive measure is on its way to becoming the solitary 
criminal punishment.43  
 
Because criminal procedure depends heavily on the deprivation of liberty, the right 
to liberty is subject to limitations allowing states to infringe this ‘freedom of 
freedom’.44 However, the deprivation of physical liberty is a grave encroachment, 
which strongly entails the danger of mistakes or abuse.45 Therefore, two important 
                                                 
37 6 ILM 368, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
38 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm, updated 26 January 2006 (accessed 12 
February 2006). 
39 Art 9(1). 
40 Dinstein (1981) 128. 
41 Nowak (1993) 160. 
42 Dinstein (1981) 128-29. 
43 Apart from fines. See Nowak (1993) 159. 
44 Dinstein (1981) 128. 
45 Mahomed (1989) 550-52. 
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safeguards must be adhered to in order to comply with treaty obligations under the 
ICCPR. 
 
 The first and less onerous condition requires the lawfulness of the deprivation.46 
Detention must be based on a pre-existing domestic legal norm, which establishes both 
the reason and the procedure for such detention.47 This limitation is owed to the basic 
principle of nulla poena/crimen sine lege, even though art 9(1) applies not only to 
criminal procedure but to all deprivations of liberty.48  
 
Lawfulness is closely connected to the principles of certainty and predictability. 
The norms must be understandable and accessible to allow individuals to foresee 
which conduct will lead to detention.49 Furthermore, ‘law’ must be interpreted in a 
strict sense of a general-abstract norm derived from the domestic legislative process or 
unwritten common law.50 It is questionable whether administrative orders or 
regulations satisfy the requirement of being ‘law’.51 At least, they raise doubts about 
accessibility and, what is more, about the second condition of permissible deprivation 
of liberty: the prohibition of arbitrariness. 
 
According to the more onerous restriction, arrest or detention must not be 
arbitrary.52 The prohibition of arbitrariness qualifies the positivistic condition of 
simply having a law which authorizes detention in given circumstances.53 The 
underlying law as well as its enforcement must not be arbitrary.54 The Human Rights 
                                                 
46 ICCPR art 9(1). 
47 Nowak (1993) 171 and Dinstein (1981) 130. 
48 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 8, Article 9, UN Doc HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 8 (1994) 
para 1.
49 Cf Nowak (1993) 171-72. 
50 Nowak (1993) 171. 
51 Cf Nowak (1993) 171, who argues that a systematic interpretation of the word ‘law’ in the Covenant 
excludes administrative provisions. Dinstein (1981) 129, however, comes to the opposite conclusion 
while looking at the generic meaning of the term ‘law’. 
52 ICCPR art 9(1). 
53 In a strict sense, despotic laws invoked by the Nazi regime were completely legal and could have been 
justified under the condition of lawfulness. Cf Hassan ‘The word “arbitrary” as used in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: “illegal” or “unjust”?’ (1969) 10 Harvard International LJ 237. 
54 Nowak (1993) 172. 
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Committee (HRC) specified that detention is arbitrary when it is unjust, inappropriate, 
unpredictable, unnecessary, unreasonable55 or unproportional.56  
 
While it is often difficult to determine whether this ‘international minimum 
standard’57 has been violated in practice, the HRC makes its findings on review of the 
context and circumstances of each case brought before it. For example, the HRC found 
detentions arbitrary in cases of kidnappings or disappearances of persons58 and where 
persons were detained because they exercised other human rights such as freedom of 
expression, religion and consciousness.59 Particularly interesting for the purpose of 
this paper are the HRC’s findings of arbitrariness in cases of detention without 
charges60 or without warrant.61 Furthermore, Peru was criticized for allowing 
preventive detention in connection with terrorism for up to 15 days, which raised 
‘serious issues with regard to article 9’ of the ICCPR.62
 
Art 9 further introduces several procedural rights to protect from arbitrary 
detention. Firstly, the detainee must be informed of the reasons for his or her arrest.63 
This duty applies to criminal cases as well as preventive detention.64 The information 
must be given immediately at the time of the arrest, but, in cases of the latter, it is 
sufficient that the information is of a more general nature.65 While the reasons need 
not be legally founded in the first place, they must not, on the other hand, lack 
                                                 
55 See for the first five Hugo van Alphen v The Netherlands, No 305/1988, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (1990) para 5.8. The Human Rights Committee stated in this case that 
detention would be reasonable if it was necessary to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the 
recurrence of the crime. 
56 A v Australia, No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997) para 9.4, where an 
illegal immigrant’s detention for four years was held to be arbitrary because this period was 
unproportional. 
57 Dinstein (1981) 130. 
58 Delia Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, No 52/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984) para 13 and 
Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, No 56/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 92 (1984) para 11. 
59 Monja Jaona v Madagascar, No 132/1982, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 161 (1990) para 14. 
60 Daniel Monguya Mbenge v Zaire, No 16/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 76 (1990) para 20. 
61 Hiber Conteris v Uruguay, No 139/1983, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 168 (1990) para 10.  
62 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru (25/07/96), UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/Add.67; A/51/40 para 356. 
63 ICCPR art 9(2). 
64 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 8 para 4. 
65 Nowak (1993) 175. 
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substance – it is, for example, insufficient when it is solely referred to the legal basis 
of the arrest.66  
 
Subsequently, the detainee must receive specific legal information regarding the 
grounds of the detention order promptly.67 Although in cases of administrative 
detention no criminal charges are brought, the specific acts or threats that are alleged 
must be specified in each case rather than stating simply a threat to society or national 
security in general.68 The duty to inform should prevent a ‘Kafkaesque’69 situation all 
too common to detention without trial in which the individual faces state power taking 
his liberty without knowing why. 
 
The right to prompt and specific information is also essential for the second 
procedural safeguard, the right to judicial review without delay.70 This right resembles 
the Anglo-American right of habeas corpus and the Hispanic right of amparo.71 It is 
of special significance in cases of detention without trial as it provides an objective test 
of the procedural lawfulness as well as the reasonableness of executive orders, which 
tend to be rather subjective in nature.72 In fact, the right to judicial review applies only 
to cases of detention without trial, because a court order for detention satisfies the 
requirement of judicial review.73  
 
A court may be called a court in this regard, when it fulfils the criteria of 
independence from the parties and impartiality.74 The former criterion aims at the 
separation of powers and demands that the judicial authority is neither subject to the 
                                                 
66 Adolfo Drescher Caldas v Uruguay, No 43/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 80 (1990) para 13.2. See 
also Nowak (1993) 175. 
67 Jayawickrama (2002) 401-02 and Nowak (1993) 175. According to Nowak ‘promptly’ means during 
the first interrogation at the latest. 
68 Jayawickrama (2002) 402. 
69 Dinstein (1981) 131. 
70 ICCPR art 9(4). The time elapsing until review proceedings commence should not exceed a few 
weeks. Cf Paul Kelly v Jamaica, No 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 at 60 (1991) para 5.6, 
where the Human Rights Committee found 5 weeks as exceeding due time. Cf also Nowak (1993) 179. 
71 See on the right of amparo Camargo ‘The claim of “amparo” in Mexico: constitutional protection of 
human rights’ (1969-1970) 6 California Western LR 201. 
72 Jayawickrama (2002) 416. 
73 Dinstein (1981) 134-35. 
74 Jayawickrama (2002) 420 and Nowak (1993) 244-46. 
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executive in appointment or impeachment, nor subject to executive directives.75 
Hence, military tribunals or other specially appointed courts raise serious concerns. 
The latter criterion requires a court to be neutral and unbiased in his judgment, which 
might be jeopardized in highly politicized cases involving terrorism. 
 
Furthermore, a court must be competent to order the release of the detainee if it 
deems detention unlawful or unreasonable.76 Formal review powers which confine the 
court to monitoring compliance with domestic law are not sufficient.77 That would be 
the case when the court’s power is limited to an assessment of whether an individual is 
a ‘designated person’ within the meaning of some domestic law. Rather, the court must 
be entitled to release a person when it determines that detention violates other national 
or international norms, such as art 9 of the ICCPR.78  
 
Another procedural safeguard is the right to compensation in cases of unlawful 
detention.79 This is somewhat different as it applies after the fact and provides a 
disincentive for the state rather than immediate protection for the individual.80 What it 
can do is to ameliorate injustices suffered and rehabilitate the detainee.  
 
The right to liberty, however, must be distinguished from the right to security 
provided for in art 9(1), since the latter obliges the state to take appropriate and 
reasonable positive action to protect individuals from private interference with their 
rights to life and personal integrity.81 It is, however, unclear where this obligation 
ends. A state cannot possibly control any private action and cannot therefore protect 
the individual from any threat.82  
                                                 
75 Nowak (1993) 245-46. 
76 Jayawickrama (2002) 421. 
77 A v Australia (1997), para 9.5.
78 A v Australia (1997), para 9.5. See also Jayawickrama (2002) 423.
79 ICCPR art 9(5). 
80 Nowak (1993) 180. 
81 William Eduardo Delgado Páez v Colombia, No 195/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990) 
para 5.5. See also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 44. 
82 In Carmichele the South African Supreme Court found the state liable in a case of negligent failure to 
protect a citizen from a particular known threat, posed by by a man who was awaiting trial for having 
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This problem is particularly interesting from a counterterrorism perspective. Art 
9(1) of the ICCPR might be interpreted as containing a conflict of norms: states need 
to infringe the right to personal liberty to meet their obligation to protect the right to 
security of the person from private terrorist actors.83 Such interpretation is, however, 
not tenable. Firstly, the obligation to act arises in specific cases of known threats to life 
and personal integrity only, rather than to oblige the state to protect from any abstract 
and general dangers.84 Even if it were so, the infringement of the right to personal 
liberty in contradiction to art 9 can hardly be seen as appropriate or reasonable 
measure as rights should be protected within the human rights framework and not at 
the expense of one another.85
 
2.3.2. Regional human rights norms on detention without trial 
The preservation of human rights was also put on regional agendas, leading to the 
conclusion of regional human rights treaties. The provisions relating to detention 
without trial in these treaties are quite similar to art 9 of the ICCPR, although several 
differences need to be highlighted. Furthermore, regional human rights jurisprudence 
adds to an elaborated interpretation of rights.86  
 
The most advanced regional treaty is without a doubt the European Convention 
(EuCHR).87 Its art 5 differs insofar as it does not expressly prohibit arbitrariness, but 
enlists exhaustively cases of permissible deprivation of liberty which also need to be in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.88 The European Court of Human 
Rights (EurCtHR), however, made clear that detention is only lawful when it is in 
                                                                                                                                             
attempted to rape another woman. Despite his history of sexual violence, the police and prosecutor had 
recommended his release without bail. See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 para 74.
83 Cf Dickson ‘Law versus terrorism: can law win?’ (2005) 10 European Human Rights LR 12. 
84 Delgado Páez v Colombia (1990) para 5.5. Cf also Hoffman ‘Human rights and terrorism’ (2004) 26 
Human Rights Q 950. 
85 Cf Hoffman (2004) 949. 
86 Especially the vast jurisprudence of the EurCtHR.  
87 See fn 15 above. 
88 EuCHR art 5(1). Permissible cases include imprisonment after conviction, non-compliance with court 
orders, pre-trial detention, educational supervision of minors, quarantine to prevent spreading of 




strict compliance with domestic as well as with conventional law and, in addition, is 
not arbitrary.89  
 
Of particular interest is art 5(1)c, which permits detention in order to prevent the 
committing of an offence. What may sound like preventive detention in the first place 
rather amounts to detention on remand, because detention must serve the purpose of 
bringing the detainee before the competent legal authority.90 Art 5(3) particularly 
relates to detention under art 5(1)c and provides for prompt appearance before a 
judicial authority and the right to be tried within a reasonable time. Hence, detention 
without trial is proscribed under the European Convention.91  
 
The rights to prompt information,92 to judicial review93 and to compensation94 
feature in this regional arrangement as well. They are shaped and interpreted like the 
procedural safeguards of the ICCPR. 
 
The EurCtHR has confirmed that these protections also apply in cases of 
terrorism.95 The court also confirmed that art 5(1)c aims at the prevention of concrete 
and specific crimes, and, hence, does not allow for preventive detention in a more 
general campaign.96 In another terrorism-related case, the Court found it insufficient to 
base arrest and detention on the honest belief that the detainees were terrorists.97 It 
                                                 
89 Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387, 405. See also Jacobs and White The 
European convention on human rights (1996) 80-81. 
90 EuCHR art 5(1)c. Such judicial authority may be an investigatorial judge (‘juge d’instruction’ or 
‘Untersuchungsrichter’) who investigates and decides on the charges of the case in inquisitorial systems 
or a magistrate who decides on release or release on bail in accusatorial systems. See Jacobs and White 
(1996) 84-5. 
91 Cf Jacobs and White (1996) 85. 
92 Art 5(2) goes further than art 9(2) of the ICCPR in that information must be given in a language the 
arrested person understands. 
93 Art 5(4) providing for speedily decision of the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty. 
94 Art 5(5) stipulates that the right shall be enforceable. 
95 Lawless v UK (1979-80) 1 EHRR 15, 33-34. 
96 Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 333, 368 and Ciulla v Italy (1991) 13 EHRR 346, 356.See also 
Jacobs and White (1996) 86. In these cases the campaign was pursued to fight organized crime, namely 
the Mafia. By analogy, the above said also applies to campaigns against terrorism. 
97 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 157, 169. 
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stated that the lack of an objective basis for such belief does not live up to the 
requirement of reasonable suspicion and, therefore, violates art 5 of the Convention.98  
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR)99 resembles the 
provisions of the ICCPR and the EuCHR closely.100 While the AmCHR provides for 
similar substantive (lawfulness and prohibition of arbitrariness) and procedural rights 
(information, judicial review) with regard to the deprivation of liberty,101 it lacks the 
right to compensation. As has been said before, compensation is of minor significance 
for the immediate protection of persons caught in the claws of state power, because it 
applies after the fact.102
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)103 is regarded as 
providing the least protection of the right to liberty. 104 The relevant provision does not 
mention expressly any of the procedural safeguards of the other instruments.105 The 
procedural safeguards can only be inferred from art 6.106
 
A closer look, however, reveals that analogous rights are available under the 
African Convention.107 Art 6 read in connection with art 7, which provides for the 
right to have one’s cause heard and the right to appeal when fundamental rights are 
violated, points to the right of judicial review. Recognising international human rights 
standards, the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights made clear that 
detainees shall be informed of the reasons at the time of the arrest in an understandable 
                                                 
98 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 169. 
99 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 9 ILM 673, entered into force 18 July 
1978. 
100 Apart from the exhaustive list of circumstances of permissible deprivation of liberty in the EuCHR. 
101 Art 7. 
102 See ch 2.3.1. above. 
103 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 ILM 58, entered into force on 21 
October 1986. 
104 Freeman and Van Ert International human rights law (2004) 265. Cf also Rehman International 
human rights law: a practical approach (2003) 243-44. 
105 Art 6. 
106 Ouguergouz The African charter of human and peoples’ rights: a comprehensive agenda for human 
dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (2003) 120. 
107 Cf Ouguergouz (2003) 143. 
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language and be informed of any charges promptly.108 Furthermore, they are entitled 
to be brought before judicial authority promptly and receive trial or release within 
reasonable time.109 A right to compensation, however, is not envisaged. 
 
In summary, the universal and regional treaties establish a fairly uniform minimum 
standard for the deprivation of liberty. This standard of due process consists of the 
substantive qualifications of lawfulness and non-arbitrariness, as well as procedural 
safeguards, namely, the rights to be informed, to challenge the deprivation and to have 
it tested by an independent and competent judicial authority. With a view to the 
practice of detention based on the decision of an executive organ, the right to have this 
decision reviewed by an independent adjudicative process is of particular importance. 
Judicial review limits the otherwise unfettered power to detain and helps preventing 
abusive and mistaken exercise of this power. 
 
2.3.3. Derogation clauses 
While states have a duty to fulfil their obligations under these human rights 
treaties, circumstances might arise where upholding certain rights may not be feasible. 
States should not be compelled to uphold all rights in situations of emergency, when 
this could cause their own demise.110 With exception of the African Charter, the 
treaties provide for member states’ right of derogation in a similar way.111
 
From a state perspective, derogation clauses acknowledge that prima facie 
violations may sometimes be necessary and at the same time allow the violator to stay 
within the legal framework. From a treaty perspective, derogation clauses strengthen 
authority, because they allow for exceptional non-observance of particular provisions, 
while they preserve the binding force of the treaty in general. Furthermore, keeping 
emergency measures within the treaty system and preserving norms’ general integrity 
                                                 
108 Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) ACHPR /Res 4(XI)92. 
109 Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) ACHPR /Res 4(XI)92. 
110 Dicey Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (1959) 412-13. See also Dyzenhaus 
‘The state of emergency in legal theory’ in Ramraj, Hor and Roach Global anti-terrorism law and policy 
(2005) 65. 
111 ICCPR art 4, EuCHR art 15 and AmCHR art 27. See also Oraá Human rights in states of emergency 
in international law (1992) 16. 
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obviates the emergence of new norms of customary nature which alter the given 
rights.112
 
Derogation, however, is linked to strict conditions. Firstly, a state of emergency 
must exist, which threatens the life of the nation.113 Such an exceptional situation must 
threaten at least one of the constituent elements of the state, that is population, territory 
or political functioning.114 This may inter alia encompass war,115 rebellion, natural 
disasters, but also situations of terrorism.116 Additionally, the emergency must be 
actual or imminent and affect the whole or at least large parts of the population.117 
Furthermore, the state of emergency is a strict temporary concept, thus proscribing 
permanent states of emergency.118 Most constitutions permit the declaration of states 
of emergency solely for limited time periods.119  
 
States are, however, not free to suspend whatever rights they choose, once such a 
narrowly drawn emergency becomes apparent. Rather, the second condition demands 
that the particular derogation and, in addition, the concrete measures taken are strictly 
required to overcome the situation of emergency,120 which implies strict necessity, 
efficacy and proportionality. Furthermore, the various provisions stipulate consistency 
                                                 
112 The possibility of emergency measures becoming the norm within the human rights framework is 
limited by strict conditions that have to be met. 
113 See for the insignificance of the different wording in the AmCHR Oraá Human rights in states of 
emergency in international law (1992) 16 and 32. 
114 Cf Oraá (1992) 33. 
115 While the EuCHR and the AmCHR explicitly refer to war, the ICCPR omits this reference. This 
omission is due to the fact that the UN system was created to eradicate the ‘scourge of war’ and the 
major human rights treaty should not have endowed ‘war’ with new legitimacy with explicitly recurring 
to it. There is, however, no doubt that a situation of ‘war’ may constitute a state of emergency under the 
ICCPR as well. See Oraá (1992) 12. 
116 For the qualification of terrorism as causing a state of emergency see Lawless v UK (1979-80) 1 
EHRR 31-32. 
117 Lawless v UK (1979-80) 1 EHRR 32. See also Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 553, 587, which 
recognized the possibility of a regional emergency. 
118 Oraá (1992) 30. 
119 Oraá (1992) 30. 
120 ICCPR art 4(1), EuCHR art 15(1) and AmCHR art 27(1). 
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with obligations under other international law instruments and proscribe the 
discriminatory exercise of emergency powers.121
 
While certain core rights are qualified as non-derogable, the right to liberty is not 
included.122 However, the HRC emphasized that the prohibition on taking hostages, 
abduction and ‘unacknowledged detention’ may not be derogated from.123 
Furthermore, the HRC argued that fundamental rights of due process – such as judicial 
review of detention – are so essential for the preservation of non-derogable rights in 
times of crisis that they themselves become non-derogable.124  
 
Finally, the treaties oblige the derogating state to notify the respective Secretary 
General immediately125 of the suspended provisions and measures taken, the reasons 
therefore as well as the termination of emergency measures and derogations.126 This 
duty to inform is owed to the transparency needed to verify the legality of the 
derogation. It also provides publicity to advance certainty of law (Rechtssicherheit) for 
the affected population.127  
 
The African Charter, in contrast, makes no mention of a derogation clause. The 
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights concluded that, due to this 
                                                 
121 On the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. See ICCPR art 4(1) and 
AmCHR art 27(1). With the EuCHR such prohibition can be inferred from art 14 which prohibits 
discrimination with regard to the Convention’s rights more generally. 
122 For example the right to life, the prohibition of torture, slavery and the principle of non-retroactivity. 
123 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29 states of emergency (Article 4), UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) para 13(b). 
124 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29 paras 15 and 16. See also Hartman ‘Working 
paper for the Committee of Experts on the article 4 derogation provision (1985) 7 Human Rights Q 118-
120. AmCHR art 27(2) supports this contention as it provides for non-derogability of ‘judicial 
guarantees essential for the protection of such [ie non-derogable] rights’. 
125 Which means without any avoidable delay. In the Greek Case a period of four months until 
notification was deemed in violation of EuCHR art 4(3), whereas in Lawless a delay of twelve days was 
found to comply with the requirement. See Greek Case Report of the European Commission of Human 
Rights (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 1, 42-43 and Lawless v UK 
(1979-80) 1 EHRR 36. See also Oraá (1992) 60-61. 
126 ICCPR art 4(3), EuCHR art 15(3) and AmCHR art 27(3). 
127 ICCPR art 4(1) points in that direction as it demands that the existence of a state of emergency must 
be officially proclaimed. 
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omission, derogation is not permissible whatever the circumstances are.128 The African 
Charter, however, causes concerns due to the appearance of so-called ‘claw back 
clauses’ which permit states to impair rights by simply referring to domestic law.129 
Art 6 of the ACHPR provides that ‘no one may be deprived of his freedom except for 
reasons and conditions previously laid down by law’ [emphasis added]. 
 
2.3.4. International customary human rights law 
While the human rights treaties bind only their signatories, they bear the potential 
of creating binding norms of international customary law, especially when their 
similarities are taken together.130 The customary prohibition of arbitrary detention 
further rests on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights131 and numerous national 
constitutions and court decisions.132 Like in the treaties, detention is considered 
arbitrary in international customary law when it has no basis in law, when it is unjust 
and unreasonable, when proper information as to the charges is not provided and when 
there is a failure of judicial review.133  
 
                                                 
128 Amnesty International and Others v Sudan (2000) African Human Rights LR 297 (ACHPR 1999) 
para 42 and para 79 which states that ‘the restriction of human rights is not a solution to national 
difficulties’. See also Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertes v Chad (2000) 
African Human Rights LR 66 (ACHPR 1995) para 21. However, it has been contended that member 
states simply had no intention to regulate derogation. Hence, the ACHPR would permit derogation 
regulated by general principles of international law. See Ouguergouz (2003) 427 and 429-79. 
129 Rehman (2003) 238-39.  
130 As they are evidence of general state practice as well as opinio iuris, given the vast number o f 
ratifications. The ICCPR has currently 155 member states, see fn 38. The EuCHR has 46 member states, 
which encompasses all members of the Council of Europe, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (accessed 
on 12 February 2006). The AmCHR has been ratified by 23 out of 35 OAS member states, see 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/DIL/treaties_and_agreements.
htm(accessed on 12 February 2006). The ACHPR has 53 member states, ie all members of the African 
Union, see http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples
%20Rights.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2006).  
131 GA res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
132 See Alvarez-Machain v US, 331 F 3d 604, 620-21 (9  Cir 2003) and .th  See also Bassiouni ‘Human 
rights in the context of criminal justice: identifying international procedural protections and equivalent 
protections in national constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke J of Comparative & International L 260-61 and 
American Law Institute Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(1987) para 702. See also Henkin et al Human rights (1999) 349-355. 
133 Alvarez-Machain v US (2003) 621-22 and Henkin (1999) 352. 
  
 22
According to this universally accepted customary norm, detention is only 
permissible within the limits of due process. It is, however, questionable, whether 
these limits are also norms of peremptory international law (ius cogens).134 The 
prohibition of arbitrary detention does not belong to the core of rights which are 
peremptory without any doubt.135
 
In contrast to ordinary customary norms, ius cogens norms cannot be derogated 
from by treaty and may only be altered by another norm of ius cogens.136 The fact that 
three major human rights treaties allow for derogation of the respective provisions 
relating to arbitrary detention suggests that this prohibition cannot be classified as 
peremptory. This is even more so, since the derogation clauses are still far from 
obsolete at present.137  
 
2.4. Detention of terrorist suspects and International Humanitarian Law 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US government was quick to declare a 
‘war’ on terrorism.138 While it is profoundly doubtful whether ‘war’ may be declared 
on a social phenomenon with more than just rhetorical significance,139 there is no 
doubt that the ‘war on terrorism’ generated two international armed conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The situation of armed conflict involves another set of rules for 
the protection of the individual. These are the rules of international humanitarian law, 
or ius in bello, which limit the conduct of states in times of war. 
 
                                                 
134 It would follow from such a classification that states could not  
135 Such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, murder as state policy and torture. Cf Restatement… 
Henkin (1999) 354 and Rehman (2003) 61. 
136 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 8 ILM 679 art 53. See also American Law Institute 
(1987) para 102, comment (k), Brownlie Principles of public international law (2003) 597-98 and 
Freeman and Van Ert (2004) 163.  
137 See for example the recent derogation by the UK: Council of Europe ‘United Kingdom derogation 
under Art.15 ECHR / Public Emergency after 11September 2001’ (2001) 22 Human Rights LJ 465. 
138 President Bush ‘Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation’ 11 September 2001, 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (as of 24 January 2006). 
See also Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for 
the recent attacks launched against the United States, 18 September 2001, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 
224 (2001). 
139 Mégret ‘“War”? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence’ (2002) 13 European J of International 
L 362-64. See further Condorelli and Naqvi ‘The war against terrorism and ius in bello: are the Geneva 
Conventions out of date?’ in Bianchi Enforcing international law against terrorism (2004) 30-33. 
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2.4.1. The Geneva Conventions 
The major codified basis of humanitarian law relevant to this thesis is found in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.140 The Conventions are based on a dichotomy in status: 
persons are either combatants, who participate in hostilities actively, or they are non-
combatants, who do not participate.141 Each of the two groups is endowed with certain 
rights which protect them according to their status.142  
 
The distinction is also apparent from the perspective of detention and deprivation 
of liberty. Combatants may be detained indefinitely as long as active hostilities are 
taking place.143 They must, however, be awarded the status of prisoner-of war (POW). 
This status puts POWs under special protection, according to which they may not be 
punished for legal conduct of warfare.144 Since they are not interned due to any 
wrongdoing in the first place, the purpose of detention is not to punish POWs, but to 
keep them away from fighting in the battlefield.145  
 
This purpose also introduces a temporal element: POWs must be released and 
repatriated as soon as active hostilities end, because cessation of such hostilities 
eliminates the justification for detention.146 Rapid termination is further warranted, 
                                                 
140 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 
signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950. 192 states are members to this treaty. See 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ‘States party to the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977’ 12 April 2005. 
141 See Uhler and Coursier Commentary: IV Geneva Convention (1958) 51. See also Condorelli and 
Naqvi (2004) 35. 
142 See Geneva Convention III for the former and Geneva Convention IV for the latter. 
143 Geneva Convention III arts 21 and 118. See also Franck (2004) 686. 
144 Geneva Convention III art 99. See also Franck (2004) 686. See for the protection standards Geneva 
Convention III part II, providing inter alia for respectful and honourable treatment, internment in 
military camps and not in penitentiaries, exercise of religious and recreational activities and even 
monthly payment of POWs. POWs may be prosecuted and convicted subsequently for criminal offences 
under national or international law. See Geneva Convention III art 99. See also McDonald and Sullivan 
‘Rational interpretation in irrational times: the third Geneva Convention and the “war on terror”’ (2003) 
44 Harvard International LJ 314. 
145 Geneva Convention III art 118. See also De Preux Commentary: III Geneva Convention (1960) 546-
47. 
146 De Preux (1960) 547. 
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because not only the conditions of internment are deemed harsh and painful, but also 
the situation of captivity itself.147 From the perspective of the Geneva Conventions’ 
general purpose of mitigating the hardships of war, art 118 aims at minimizing 
unnecessary detention of combatants.148
 
The Conventions were drafted from the perspective of conventional – world war II 
– warfare.149 The ‘war on terrorism’ therefore raises two major problems regarding the 
detention of POWs. Firstly, termination of active hostilities could be determined quite 
easily in conventional wars.150 Nowadays the end of armed conflicts is much harder to 
establish. In the case of the ‘war on terrorism’, this becomes virtually impossible, 
because this phenomenon can never be eradicated completely.151 When could a victory 
possibly be celebrated? 
 
The infiniteness potentially leads to the assumption that terrorist ‘combatants’ may 
be detained indefinitely, even if this may last for their whole life.152 This assumption 
may be bolstered by the probability of such ‘combatants’ to take up arms again and re-
engage in terrorist action.153 Such an approach, taken together with its outcome, is, 
however, odd, given the Conventions’ purpose to appease the conditions of war. 
 
The second problem lies in the qualification as ‘combatant’ entitling the state to 
detain and the individual to POW status. Geneva Convention III sets out who belongs 
to the category of combatants. It includes regular soldiers,154 civilian personnel 
associated with the military,155 inhabitants defending themselves unorganised,156 and 
members of other irregular forces, provided they fulfil the conditions of being under a 
chain of command, showing a distinctive sign, carrying arms openly and adhering to 
                                                 
147 De Preux (1960) 546. 
148 McDonald and Sullivan (2003) 314-15. 
149 McDonald and Sullivan (2003) 313. 
150 Mariner ‘Indefinite detention on Guantanamo’ (2002a) Find Law‘s Writ, 28 May 2002. 
151 Just as crime can never be eradicated. Cf Mariner (2002a). 
152 McDonald and Sullivan (2003) 312-13. Cf Roberts (2004) 743. 
153 Cf McDonald and Sullivan (2003) 314 and Franck (2004) 687. 
154 Art 4 A(1) and (3). 
155 Art 4 A(4) and (5). 
156 Art 4 A(6). 
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the ius in bello.157 Terrorist suspects captured during an armed conflict would 
probably fit best in the last category.158
 
In present-day conflicts, distinctions between combatants and non-combatants are 
increasingly blurred, so it often becomes difficult to determine the status of captured 
persons. If any doubts as to such status arise, the determination shall be made by a 
competent tribunal.159 Like in international human rights standards, such a tribunal 
needs to be independent, impartial and competent to make a binding decision in each 
individual case.160 This is due to the grave consequences such a decision may have as 
well as to international judicial minimum standards generally accepted.161
 
Persons not qualifying for combatant and POW status, automatically have the 
status of a civilian.162 Geneva Convention IV, however, does not protect all civilians 
equally, but distinguishes according to the nationality of persons. The definition of 
protected persons excludes the detaining state’s own nationals, as well as nationals of 
neutral or co-belligerent states as long as normal diplomatic protection is available to 
them.163  
 
                                                 
157 Art 4 A(2). 
158 Cf Aldrich ‘The Taliban, Al Qaeda and the determination of illegal combatants’ (2002) 96 American 
J of International L 894-96 and Neier ‘The military tribunals on trial’ (2003) 50 New York Review of 
Books, no 17, 17 November 2003. 
159 Geneva Convention III art 5. 
160 Cf Geneva Convention III art 84. See also UN Commission of Human Rights, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Civil and political rights, including the question of torture and detention, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2003/8, 16 December 2002, para 64 and US v Noriega, 808 F Supp 791, 796 (SD Fla 1992). See 
further Vierucci ‘Prisoners of war or protected persons qua unlawful combatants? The judicial 
safeguards to which Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled’ (2003) 1 J of International Criminal 
Justice 302.  
161 Vierucci (2003) 302. 
162 Uhler and Coursier (1958) 51. 
163 Geneva Convention IV art 4. Uhler and Coursier (1958) 46 divides the class of protected persons into 
‘enemy nationals within the national territory of the each of the Parties to the conflict’ and ‘the whole 
population of occupied territories (excluding nationals of the Occupying Power)’. The ‘diplomatic 
protection’ exception is due to the rationale, that persons who can resort to diplomatic protection do not 
need protection under the Convention. See Vierucci (2003) 310 and Sassòli ‘The status of persons held 




The nationality exception was, however, interpreted progressively in light of the 
change of nature of contemporary conflicts in the Tadić case.164 The Court emphasized 
factual allegiance to one of the parties to the conflict rather than formal bonds of 
nationality. In the case of the ‘war on terrorism’, allegiance to the jihad, for example, 
may substitute mere formal nationality, thus, expanding the eligible group of protected 
persons.165
 
Protected persons may only be deprived of their liberty in two exceptional 
cases.166 Firstly, they may be detained for the purpose of ordinary criminal prosecution 
and punishment under domestic law.167 Secondly, they may be detained for imperative 
security reasons.168  
 
Resort to the latter measure, however, is limited. Substantively, detention for 
security reasons must be an exceptional measure of absolute necessity, although in 
practice states enjoy a considerable measure of discretion in assessing exceptional 
circumstances and military necessity.169 Detention orders must further be made on an 
individual, rather than a general or group basis.170 Procedural requirements encompass 
a prompt right of appeal and the right of biannual periodical review thereafter.171 
Although review can be carried out by administrative boards, these boards must again 
be independent, impartial and competent.172 Furthermore, such detention of civilians is 
subject to detailed rules regulating their treatment.173  
 
                                                 
164 Prosecutor v Tadić (IT-94-1-A) Appeals chamber, Judgment of 15 July 1999 para 166. 
165 Vierucci (2003) 310 citing further support for this interpretation, for example the US Army Field 
Manual. 
166 Geneva Convention IV art 79. 
167 Geneva Convention IV art 64. See also Sassòli (2004) 104. 
168 Geneva Convention IV arts 42 and 78. 
169 Geneva Convention IV arts 42 and 78. See also Uhler and Coursier (1958) 257-58 and 367.  
170 Uhler and Coursier (1958) 367. 
171 Geneva Convention IV arts 43 and 78. 
172 Geneva Convention IV arts 43 and 78. See also Uhler and Coursier (1958) 260 and Sassòli (2004) 
104. 
173 Geneva Convcention IV arts 79-135. See also Sassòli (2004) 104. 
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Civilians exempted from the protected person status174 are mainly subject to the 
law of the detaining state, since the general protection clauses of Part II of Geneva 
Convention IV make no mention of rights relating to the detention.175 What offers 
protection with regard to the deprivation of liberty, however, is common art 3, which 
features in all four Geneva Conventions. This provision introduces a minimum 
standard applicable to all non-combatants in any armed conflict.176  
 
Art 3(1)(d) prohibits the passing of sentences without proper trial, that satisfies 
judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.177 As these 
minimum guarantees are derived from both human rights and humanitarian law, they 
include the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the right to be informed of the grounds 
for detention as well as the right to challenge detention before a judge within 
reasonable time.178 Hence, conventional international humanitarian law envisages 
minimum standards similar to international human rights law regarding the detention 
of non-combatants. 
 
                                                 
174 Nationals of the respective state or nationals of allied or neutral states with the possibility of 
diplomatic protection. 
175 Arts 13-26 provide for restrictions in the conduct of war, protecting especially children, women, the 
aged and wounded and sick persons. Part II features practical measures intended to diminish destruction, 
rather than safeguards against arbitrary action. See Uhler and Coursier (1958) 118. Cf also Vierucci 
(2003) 298. 
176 Geneva Conventions I-IV art 3 targets non-international armed conflicts, but it is generally accepted 
that it applies to international armed conflicts as well: ‘Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-
international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules 
also constitute a minimum yardstick.’ See Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) (1986) ICJ Rep 114. See 
also Vierucci (2003) 310-11. 
177 As well as carrying out executions without proper trial. Cf also Uhler and Coursier (1958) 39. 
178 Vierucci (2003) 311 and Meron Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (1989) 96. 
See also Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, signed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1979, art 75(3) which provides that ‘[a]ny person arrested, detained or interned for actions 
related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons 
why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such 
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the 
circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist’.  
  
 28
2.4.2. International customary humanitarian law 
Common art 3 is also recognized as part of international customary law,179 as well 
as the fundamental guarantees laid down in art 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions.180 Art 75 provides that anyone held by a party to an armed conflict must 
be afforded judicial safeguards and basic due process rights, regardless of nationality 
or status.181  
 
Apart from these minimum standards, international customary law also grants 
more favourable protection to protected persons. While acknowledging the right to 
detain POWs as long as hostilities continue, international customary law prohibits 
arbitrary detention of any kind.182 Accordingly, detention is only legal when its 
purpose satisfies valid needs.183 Furthermore, procedural requirements must be 
adhered to in order to prevent arbitrary detention. These safeguards include the 
obligation to inform the detainee of the reasons for detention and the detainee’s right 
to challenge detention before an independent judicial authority.184
 
Furthermore, international customary law also pursues the goal of mitigating 
effects of warfare and, hence, obliges states not to hold anyone for a longer time than 
absolutely necessary.185 This applies to POWs, who must be repatriated without delay 
after the cessation of active hostilities, as well as to civilians, who must be released as 
soon as the grounds for their detention cease to exist.186  
 
                                                 
179 Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) (1986) ICJ Rep 114. See also Meron (1989) 28 and 34-35. 
180 Matheson ‘The United States position on the relation of customary international law to the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ (1987) 2 American University J of International 
L & Policy 427 and Taft ‘The law of armed conflict after 9/11: some salient features’ (2003) 28 Yale J 
of International L 322. See also Meron (1989) 65 and Vierucci (2003) 311-12. 
181 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions art 75(3), (4) and (6). See also Vierucci (2003) 312. 
182 ICRC Customary international humanitarian law (2005) 344-45. 
183 ICRC (2005) 345. 
184 ICRC (2005) 349-52. 
185 ICRC (2005) 451-56. 
186 ICRC (2005) 451. 
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2.5. The prohibition of detention without trial 
In order to fulfil their function of providing security and order, states depend on 
the power to deprive persons of their individual liberty. This power, however, is likely 
to be abused or employed incorrectly, not least when it is used to counter highly 
emotionalised threats like terrorism.187 Moreover, deprivation of liberty burdens 
affected individuals with grave consequences, which bear the potential of destroying 
lives and, in the worst cases, even causing death. 
 
Responding to these flaws, the exercise of state power has been subjected to 
restrictions for centuries.188 The restrictions are nowadays codified in the international 
law of human rights, complemented by humanitarian law in times of armed conflict. 
International human rights and international humanitarian law of conventional as well 
as customary nature establish one rule of general validity: the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention under all circumstances.189  
 
Several conditions need to be satisfied to render detention non-arbitrary and legal 
under international law. Firstly, detention must be justified on objective grounds in 
each individual case. In human rights law, such grounds must be stated in a prior legal 
basis and, in addition, comply with standards of basic justice, that is they must be 
reasonable, appropriate and proportional. Humanitarian law authorizes the detention of 
combatants by reason of their status as POWs as well as detention of civilians for 
imperative security reasons of absolute necessity.  
 
                                                 
187 This even more so in the case of so-called catastrophic terrorism involving mass casualties and 
destruction. See for an account of such an emotionalised approach Wedgwood ‘Countering catastrophic 
terrorism: an American view’ in Bianchi Enforcing international law against terrorism (2004) 117. Cf 
also Taft (2003) 319. 
188 Beginning with the Magna Charta of 1215.  
189 Cf Meron (1989) 96 and Vierucci (2003) 311. It is assumed that the deprivation of liberty following 
conviction for an offence according to criminal procedure is not arbitrary, given that fair trial standards 
have been met. Hence, it is the above prescribed practice of administrative detention which is viewed 
her, rather than regular imprisonment of criminals. 
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Secondly, detainees must be told why they have been arrested and detained. This 
information must be given quickly.190 Moreover, such information is necessary before 
the detainee can challenge the deprivation of liberty. 
 
This leads to the third requirement, which demands that the administrative 
decision to detain must be reviewed by a neutral third authority, at least at the request 
of the detainee. However shaped, such authority must be independent, impartial and 
competent and rely on a fair procedure. Hence, review is usually best conducted by the 
judiciary. In the case of POWs, judicial review is not necessary, unless doubts as to 
their status arise. In such cases, their status shall be determined by a neutral, 
independent and competent tribunal.191  
 
Additionally, the prohibition of arbitrary detention also involves a temporal 
element. The basic principle is: ‘the longer the detention, the higher the probability of 
arbitrariness.’ Although a specific time limit can not be found in human rights law and 
jurisprudence, the permissible period of administrative detention without trial must be 
measured in hours or days rather than weeks, following which judicial review must 
commence.192 Indefinite detention without judicial review is prohibited.  
 
Hence, there are no legal black holes in international law, into which individuals 
could fall. This even more so, as human rights law applies at any time, even in times of 
war.193 Human rights and humanitarian law norms do not contradict, but reinforce one 
another.194  
                                                 
190 POWs, however, need not be informed as they are usually aware of the fact that they may be interned 
when captured.  
191 See ch 2.4.1. above. 
192 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 8 para 2. See also Brogan v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 
117, 119 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 556, Castillo Petruzzi et al case, judgment of 30 May 1999 
[1999] IACHR 6 para 111, County of Riverside v McLaughlin, 111 S Ct 1661, 1670-71 (1991) and 
Marab v IDF Commander in the West Bank, HC 3239/02, 57(2) PD 349 para 26. See further ICRC 
(2005) 350.  
193 Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (United Nations) Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Rep 
226, 240. Cf ICRC (2005) 299. 
194 Cf Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29 para 16. See also ICRC (2005) 301-302 and 
Wilde ‘Legal “black hole”? Extraterritorial state action and international treaty law on civil and political 
rights’ (2005) 26 Michigan J of International L 787. 
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Although states may derogate from certain obligations under human rights treaties, 
derogation is limited by strict conditions of necessity, efficiency and time limitation. 
Moreover, minimum procedural guarantees are themselves non-derogable as they are 
necessary to safeguard other non-derogable rights. Accordingly, while the right to 
liberty may in principle be derogated from, derogation may not include the right to 
judicial review in such cases.195  
 
3. Detention without trial as an antiterrorism measure: case studies 
 
Now that the norms restricting detention without trial have been established, the 
focus shifts to the actual practice of states responding to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 
countering terrorism, states frequently chose to abrogate existing norms of 
international law. The case studies include the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, the two main proponents of the current ‘war on terrorism’, as well as 
Israel, which faces a similar threat. Finally, a brief survey of other states’ approaches 
pointing into a similar direction, complements the case studies.  
 
The case studies pay attention to actual detention practices and legislation 
allowing for administrative detention. Since the practices contradict existing rules of 
international law, justifications to circumvent these rules are considered in a second 
step. Thirdly, the judiciary’s view will be taken into account. Taken together, these 
components provide evidence for state practice and opinio iuris necessary for the final 
analysis in the subsequent chapter. 
 
3.1. USA 
Inevitably, the first case study focuses on the state directly affected by 9/11. The 
USA reacted to the attacks, inter alia, with the infringement of civil liberties, among 
them the right to personal liberty.196 Interestingly, the use of administrative detention 
                                                 
195 But cf Neuman (2004) 1026-28. 
196 The other major infringement of rights is caused by enhanced surveillace powers. See for an account 
of antiterrorism measures Schulhofer The enemy within: intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and 
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as a means to combat terrorism was hardly considered in the USA pre-9/11.197 The 
terrorist strikes transformed this lack of interest towards administrative detention into 
an attitude of fervent support. Legislative action resulted mainly in the adoption of the 
USA PATRIOT Act,198 while executive action culminated in the detention of 
‘unlawful combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay. The latter action is reviewed first, as it 
contradicts international law norms most blatantly. 
 
3.1.1. Executive action: ‘enemy combatants’ and mass detentions 
Without a doubt, the detention practice at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is the most 
infamous example of detention without trial in the contemporary counterterrorism 
efforts. Guantanamo Bay is a naval base on Cuban territory occupied by the USA on 
the basis of a lease treaty with Cuba from 1903.199 The USA exercises complete 
jurisdiction and control over the base, while Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty.200
 
In the course of the military operations to unseat the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, the USA started transferring captured persons, which it suspected to be 
terrorists, to Guantanamo Bay in January 2002.201 The detainees were then declared to 
be ‘unlawful combatants’, a term unknown by international law.202 As such the USA 
denied them POW protection under Geneva Convention III.203 Nor did the USA apply 
Geneva Convention IV or international human rights law, but stripped the detainees of 
                                                                                                                                             
civil liberties in the wake of September 11 (2002) and Chang Silencing political dissent: how post-
September 11 anti terrorism measures threaten our civil liberties (2002). 
197 As Gross (2001) 787 observes shortly before the terrorist attacks in New York and the Washington. 
198 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001). 
199 Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the lease of lands for coaling and naval stations, 
23 February 1903.  
200 Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the lease of lands for coaling and naval stations, 
23 February 1903 art III. 
201 Borelli ‘The treatment of terrorist suspects captured abroad: human rights and humanitarian law’ in 
Bianchi Enforcing international law against terrorism (2004) 39 and Vierucci (2003) 285.  
202 Sassòli (2004) 100-101. The terms ‘unlawful combatants’ and ‘enemy combatants’ are used 
interchangeably. 
203 US Department of Defense ‘News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers’ 11 January 2002, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01112002_t0111sd.html (accessed 30 January 
2006). See also Rasul v Bush, Brief for the respondents (2004) WL 425739 (US) 6-7. 
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most of their fundamental rights, particularly the right to personal liberty and its 
surrounding safeguards.204  
 
The US government asserted that detainees had no access to domestic courts in 
order to challenge their detention.205 Instead they could be detained indefinitely at the 
President’s sole discretion.206 Although the detainees’ status as combatants and POWs 
is doubtful, no judicial hearings were held to determine this status as demanded by 
international humanitarian law. 
 
Hence, the detainees, around 550 in number,207 found themselves in a legal limbo 
where they could not legally defend themselves against mistakes and abuse. Although 
the US government has asserted that the detainees were the ‘hardest of the hard-
core’208 and the ‘worst of a very bad lot’,209 the practice is nevertheless highly 
arbitrary and Kafkaesque. The problem is not that a terrorist is locked up, but how the 
judgment whether a person is deemed a terrorist or not, is made. This judgment is 
rendered upon executive opinion, rather than an objective finding of the judiciary after 
hearing each individual case properly. 
 
This problem also existed with regard to two American citizens, Padilla and 
Hamdi, who were both classified as ‘enemy combatants’ and held in indefinite 
administrative detention in naval brigs on American soil.210 While none of them was 
                                                 
204 Ross ‘Jurisdictional aspects of international human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror’ 
in Coomans and Kamminga Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties (2004) 17 and 
Martinez (2005) 6. The US Department of State’s legal advisor William H Taft, IV has in the meantime 
acknowledged that ‘unlawful combatants’ fall under Geneva Convention IV. See Taft (2003) 321. 
However, the government has not yet acted in accordance with its legal advisor’s opinion and is still 
reluctant to grant proper judicial review. See Sassòli (2004) 104. 
205 Rasul v Bush, Brief for the respondents (2004) WL 425739 (US) 14-16.
206 Rasul v Bush, Brief for the respondents (2004) WL 425739 (US) 16-17. See also Martinez (2005) 6. 
207 The Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (JTF-GTMO) Information from Guantanamo 
detainees, as of 4 March 2005, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050304info.pdf (accessed 30 January 2006). 
208 As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called them. Cited in Thomas (2003)1215.  
209 According to Vice President Cheney. New York Times, 28 January 2002, A6 cited in Walker (2005) 
51. President Bush announced that the detainees were all ‘killers’. See Dworkin ‘The threat to 
patriotism’ (2002) 49 New York Review of Books no 3, 28 February 2002. 
210 Jose Padilla was arrested on 8 May 2002 at the Chicago airport and held initially on a material 
witness warrant. On 9 June 2002 he was designated as ‘enemy combatant’ by a Presidential directive 
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charged with a criminal offence, let alone put to trial before a judge for three, 
respectively four years, Hamdi was released and deported in October 2004 following 
an agreement with the government.211 Padilla was detained in military custody until 
recently. He was indicted in September 2005 and ordered to be transferred to civilian 
custody.212
 
The administration derived the legal basis for detentions of ‘enemy combatants’ 
from the President’s inherent wartime powers as Commander-in-Chief.213 
Furthermore, the executive justified far-reaching Presidential detention powers with 
the Congressional authorization to use necessary force in order to prevent future 
terrorist attacks.214 Using this authorisation, the President issued an executive order 
authorizing the detention of non-citizens at his behest, leaving subsequent trial before 
military commissions only optional.215  
 
The US government’s policy consisted (and still does) of unilaterally declaring 
persons to belong to a category which does not exist in international law and putting 
them into a grey area where neither humanitarian law, nor criminal law – reflecting 
                                                                                                                                             
and incarcerated in a Navy brig in South Carolina, where he is since held without trial. It is alleged that 
he planned to explode a ‘dirty bomb’, ie a conventional bomb loaded with radioactive material. The 
directive is available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf (accessed 
31 January 2006).Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan and brought to Guantanamo Bay in 
January 2002. When his American citizenship was discovered in April 2002, he was transferred to the 
same Navy brig in South Carolina subsequently. See for both cases Weisselberg ‘The detention and 
treatment of aliens three years after September 11: a new new world?’ (2005) 38 University of 
California Davis LR 838-39. 
211 In which he renounced US citizenship and agreed not to sue the US government over his detention. 
See Agreement, Hamdi v Rumsfeld (ED Va 17 September 2004) (No 2:02CV439). See also Moeckli 
‘The US Supreme Court’s “enemy combatant” decisions: a “major victory for the rule of law”?’ (2005) 
10 J of Conflict & Security L 93. 
212 See ch 3.1.4. below. 
213 See for example the Presidential directive to detain Padilla (fn 210 above) and Rasul v Bush, Brief 
for the respondents (2004) WL 425739 (US) 16-17. See also Weisselberg (2005) 839. 
214 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States armed 
forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States, 18 September 
2001, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
215 Presidential Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 13 November 2001, 66 Fed Reg 57833, 57834 (2001) ss 2 and 3. 
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human rights law – applied.216 Consequently, minimum standards of international law 
were not adhered to.217  
 
The approach is in breach of the prohibition of arbitrary detention, since detention 
without trial for a period of more than 4 years, accompanied by the prospect of 
indefinite detention, is far too extensive. Arbitrariness is further enhanced by the fact 
that allegations, the decision on deprivation of liberty and its execution all lie in the 
hand of one single authority. This also contravenes the international minimum 
standard providing for the right to independent judicial review. 
 
In the domestic sphere, the administration resorted to immigration law to detain 
non-citizen suspects. Shortly after 9/11 the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) enacted interim rule 2171-01, which authorizes detention without trial for an 
indeterminate period of time ‘in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstance’.218 Based on interim rule 2171-01, the INS detained around 1200 non-
citizens, often on more than dubious grounds.219 They were then held, some for several 
months, until proven innocent, hence, turning the presumption of innocence on its 
head.220
 
While the approach to detain non-citizens for violations of visa regulations was 
legal in principle, the practice in these cases was overly harsh.221 The lack of 
                                                 
216 Cf Bhoumik ‘Democratic responses to terrorism: a comparative study of the United States, Israel, 
and India’ (2005) 33 Denver J of International L & Policy 320. 
217 Steyn ‘Guantanamo Bay: the legal blackhole’ (2004) 53 International & Comparative LQ 12. 
218 INS Interim rule No 2171-01, 66 Fed Reg 48334-01, 48335 (2001). 
219 Detentions resulted from anonymous or neighbour’s allegations, traffic checks or while a person was 
lingering near sensitive infrastructure. An Egyptian man was arrested, when he asked a policeman to 
show him the way to the next INS office so he could extend his visa. See Human Rights Watch (2002b) 
14-15. See also US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2003) 16-17. 
220 Ross (2004) 23. Cf also US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2003) 69-71. 
221 US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2003) 72-73. See also Schulhofer (2002) 
12 and Hoffman (2004) 946-47. Minor violations leading to detention included working on a tourist visa 
and failure to complete the prescribed number of courses for student visas. See Amnesty International 
United States of America: Amnesty International's concerns regarding post September 11 detentions in 
the USA, AMR 51/044/2002 (2002) 11 and . Cf also Weisselberg (2005) 825-30 
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proportionality, together with the random and discriminative character of detentions222 
violated minimum standards of international human rights law, which also apply to 
immigration procedures.223 This was accompanied by a pattern of mistreatment and 
abuse of these detainees, underscoring the significance of the minimum standards for 
the well being of persons deprived of their liberty.224
 
3.1.2. Legislative action: the PATRIOT Act 
The legislative branch reacted to the terrorist attacks by adopting the 
comprehensive PATRIOT Act. Actually, the bill was proposed by the executive and 
rushed through congress in short time, due to high pressure from the executive.225 
Apparently, hardly any of the representatives had read the bill before it was 
adopted.226
 
With regard to detention without trial, the PATRIOT Act contains one provision of 
concern, which authorizes the Attorney General to detain non-citizens of whom he has 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that they are engaged in terrorist activity or endanger 
national security in another way.227 Terrorist activity is defined very broadly and 
includes inter alia membership in a terrorist organisation, whether officially 
designated or not, and soliciting funds, membership or other material support to such 
an organisation, even if such organisation pursues legitimate political goals.228 
Terrorist activity is further expanded to encompass any crime involving a ‘firearm, or 
other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain)’.229  
 
                                                 
222 Obviously, only muslim or Arabic looking men were targeted of which only a handful were charged 
subsequently for minor crimes like fraud, but not a single one related terrorism, let alone in connection 
with 9/11. See Amnesty International (2002) 8 and US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector 
General (2003) 30-31 
223 Cf Ross (2004) 23. 
224 US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2003) 142-48 and Ross (2004) 23. 
225 Cole and Dempsey Terrorism and the constitution: sacrificing civil liberties in the name of national 
security (2002) 151. 
226 Cole and Dempsey (2002) 151. 
227 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351 (2001) s 412(a) . 
228 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 347 (2001) s 411(a)(1)(F). See also Chang (2002) 62-3. 
229 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 346 (2001) s 411(a)(1)(E). According to Chang (2002) 62 this definition 
stretches the term ‘terrorism’ beyond recognition, as a bar brawl involving a knife or broken beer bottle 
as well as a crime of passion would fall under this definition. 
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Upon the Attorney General’s unreviewed certification, a non-citizen may at first 
be detained for seven days without being charged.230 If, following this period, the 
Attorney General charges the person with any offence under criminal or immigration 
law, even if unrelated to terrorism, he may continue detention indefinitely.231 The only 
requirement is a biannual review of the detention by the Attorney General himself.232
 
While the detainee does not have to be informed of the evidence leading to 
certification and detention, the PATRIOT Act provides for the possibility of challenge 
in habeas corpus proceedings in a federal district court.233 In normative perspective, 
this is in compliance with international minimum standards of human rights law. In 
practice, however, the costs of filing habeas corpus and litigating before such a court 
are likely to hamper recourse to such judicial review considerably.234  
 
The PATRIOT Act’s detention powers under s 412(a) have not been invoked so 
far.235 This was due to the availability of other administrative procedures to detain 
non-citizens, namely under interim rule 2171-01, which were less unwieldy.236 Hence, 
non-usage of the provision was not due to human rights concerns, but rather to 
circumvent the legislation’s obstacles.237
 
                                                 
230 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351 (2001) s 412(a). 
231 Either until deportation of the person or the Attorney General’s decision of ending certification as 
terrorist or threat to national security respectively. See Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351 (2001) s 412(a). 
See also Chang (2002) 64. 
232 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351 (2001) s 412(a). 
233 Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351-52 (2001). See also Chang (2002) 65. 
234 Given that non-citizens are likely to be in difficult financial situation. Costs include, for example, 
hiring a lawyer or travel costs. Furthermore, appeal is only possible before the US Court of Appeals in 
Washington, DC. See Pub L 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 351-52 (2001) s 412(a). See also Chang (2002) 65-
66. 
235 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H Rept 109-174, part 1 to accompany HR 3199, USA 
PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005, 18 July 2005 (2005) 464. The report relies on the 
administration’s verbal assurance that s 412(a) has not been employed so far and raises criticism as to 
the government’s failure to provide 6 out of 7 envisaged reports on the matter. 
236 As they neither provide for habeas corpus review, nor for a duty to report invocation to Congress. 
See H Rept 109-174 (2005) 464 and Weisselberg (2005) 831. 
237 See H Rept 109-174 (2005) 464-65 and Weisselberg (2005) 831. 
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3.1.3. Justification: exceptional state of war, changed circumstances, necessity 
The US administration’s norms and practice regarding detention of terrorist 
suspects contravene minimum standards required by international law. Usually, there 
are three ways states react when they contravene rules of international law: denial of 
the action, denial of the rule’s existence or validity, or justification of the action on 
other grounds. The US government made no efforts to hide its action, but resorted to 
the last of the three options. This openness supports the contention that the US 
government felt that it was legally entitled to act in the way it did. Hence, the 
justifications stated by the executive may be viewed as expressions of opinio iuris. 
 
According to the US administration’s fundamental claim, the country is at war 
with global terrorism, in particular with the network of Al Qaeda.238 It has often been 
suggested that the struggle against terrorism is of fundamental importance for the 
survival of the nation.239 While the state of such a war constitutes exceptional 
circumstances, an end of these circumstances cannot be predicted in the nearer future, 
which has also been acknowledged by the administration itself.240 Nevertheless, this 
exceptional situation warrants exceptional measures. 
 
The ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach resembles the logic of derogation 
provisions in international human rights treaties,241 under which states are not 
compelled to uphold all the rights when this would cause their demise or at least 
substantial devastation.242 The survival of the state is valued above the protection of 
human rights.243 Indeed, the USA officially proclaimed a state of emergency in the 
aftermath of 9/11, accompanied by said congressional authorisation of the President to 
                                                 
238 See for example Rasul v Bush, Brief for the respondents (2004) WL 425739 (US) 1. See also Shelton 
‘The legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay: innovative elements in the decision of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of 12 March 2002’ (2002) 23 Human Rights LJ 14 and 
Moeckli (2005) 87-88 
239 Franck (2004) 687. 
240 See for example Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633, 2641 (2004). See also President of the United 
States of America ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States Of America, September2002’ 
(2003) 24 Human Rights LJ 135. 
241 ICCPR art 4, EuCHR art 15 and AmCHR art 27. 
242 See ch 2.3. 
243 ‘[T]reaties could never diminish the illimitable constitutional powers of the supreme commander in a 
life-or-death struggle.’ See Franck (2004) 687. 
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use military force.244 The USA did not, however, avail itself of the right of derogation 
under art 4 of the ICCPR as no notification or other declaration to this end was made. 
 
The US government claimed that global terrorism has changed circumstances 
dramatically.245 The diffuse threat, the dissolution of the geographical attachment of 
the conflict, and potentially massive damage caused with little effort supposedly 
created a completely new situation, which existing rules may not match anymore.246 
Instead, the executive claimed extraordinary powers to respond to the new threat.  
 
The specific measures were justified on grounds of necessity. In our case, 
detention without trial was deemed a necessary tool to avert the grave threat of 
terrorism to the overarching goal of national security.247 The administration’s 
interpretation of the abstract concept of national security emphasizes territorial 
security, rather than safety of the individual.248 Accordingly, the latter was 
subordinated to the former, especially in the case of terrorist suspects who are denied 
basic rights to protect themselves against state action. 
 
3.1.4. The judiciary: the Supreme Court’s view 
While the executive views itself legally entitled to detain terrorist suspects under 
domestic as well as international law, it is not the only branch of state which may 
express opinio iuris. Regarding the infringement of fundamental rights, it is also 
important to look at the opinion of the judiciary, since this branch is mainly concerned 
with the statement of what the law is. The practice of detention without trial was the 
                                                 
244 Office of the Press Secretary, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist 
Attacks, by the President of the United States of America, 14 September 2001. See also Pub L No 107-
40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
245 President of the United States of America (2003) 137. 
246 Franck (2004) 688. 
247 See the highly suggestive name of the PATRIOT Act: Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub L 107-56, 
115 Stat 272 (2001) (emphasis added). See also Strossen ‘Conservatives and Liberals unite to conserve 
liberty and security’ in Goldberg, Goldberg and Greenwald It’s a free country: personal freedom in 
America after September 11 (2002) 61 and McDonald and Sullivan (2003) 312. 
248 The President of the United States of America (2003) 138. Cf Gearty ‘Terrorism and human rights’ 
(2005b) 10 European Human Rights LR 4.  
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subject of several cases which ultimately reached the Supreme Court.249 A consistent 
conclusion was, however, neither provided by the lower courts, nor by the highest 
court. 
 
Lower courts oscillated between deference to and repudiation of the executive’s 
claims.250 Moreover, the Supreme Court took no opportunity to announce its general 
view on the detention practices and avoided commenting on applicable international 
law.251 This is even more surprising as the applicants’ argumentations, accompanied 
by numerous amicus curiae briefs, were packed with references to international human 
rights and humanitarian law.252  
 
In Rasul,253 the Supreme Court had to decide on the question whether ‘enemy 
combatants’ could challenge the legality of their detention at Guantanamo Bay in US 
courts. The petitioners claimed that they never participated in hostilities against the 
USA or engaged in terrorist acts and therefore were no ‘enemy combatants’.254 The 
challenge of legality was directed towards the factual basis of detention. 
 
The district court and the court of appeals had dismissed the suits due to lack of 
jurisdiction.255 The detainees were captured during ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan 
and subsequently detained at the US naval base in Cuba.256 Based on Eisentraeger,257 
                                                 
249 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004), Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633 and Rumsfeld v Padilla, 124 
S Ct 2711 (2004). 
250 See for example Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 296 F 3d 278 (4th Cir Va 2002), which was remanded to Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld, 243 F Supp 2d 527 (E D Va 2002). This judgment was reversed by Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 316 F 
3d 450 (4th Cir Va 2003) and en banc denied in the rehearing by Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 337 F 3d 335 (4th 
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251 Moeckli (2005) 85-87. 
252 See for example Al Odah v US, Brief for Petitioners (2004) WL 96764 and Rasul v Bush, Brief 
Amicus Curiae of International Law Expert in Support of the Petitioners (2003) WL 22429202. See also 
Moeckli (2005) 86. 
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254 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2691. 
255 Rasul v Bush, 215 F Supp 2d 55 (D DC 2002) and Al Odah v US, 321 F 3d 1134 (CA DC 2003). See 
also Otty and Olbourne ‘The US Supreme Court and the “war on terror”: Rasul and Hamdi’ (2004) 9 
European Human Rights LR 559.  
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the lower courts approved the government’s claim that aliens captured and held outside 
US sovereign territory had no recourse to habeas corpus review by US courts.258  
 
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the cases.259 Justice 
Stevens who delivered the majority opinion reasoned that in contrast to Eisentraeger 
the detainees were not charged with an offence at all, let alone tried and convicted.260 
Furthermore, US courts had jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees, because the 
USA exercised territorial jurisdiction over the leased area.261 Additionally, Justice 
Stevens found that under the federal habeas corpus statute262 the detainee’s presence 
within a court’s territorial jurisdiction was no ‘invariable prerequisite’.263 Instead the 
presence of the custodian was found to be sufficient, because the writ of habeas corpus 
is directed against the person holding the detainee.264 Finally, the historical reach of 
the writ of habeas corpus in common law extended not only to the sovereign territory 
of the realm, but also to all other dominions under the sovereign’s control.265
 
Accordingly, the detainees were entitled to challenge their designation as such in 
court.266 Although the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits,267 Rasul supported 
the prohibition of detention without trial in international law, finding that 
 
‘[e]xecutive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-
term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to 
                                                                                                                                             
Supreme Court held that US courts had no basis to extend their jurisdiction for a writ of habeas corpus, 
because ‘these prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is 
sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond 
the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.’ Johnson v Eisentrager, 70 S Ct 936, 943 
(1950).
258 Rasul v Bush, 215 F Supp 2d 65 and Al Odah v US, 321 F 3d 1145. 
259 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686. 
260 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2693. 
261 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2696. See also Otty and Olbourne (2004) 559. 
262 28 USC para 2241(a). 
263 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2695. See also Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 93 S Ct 
1123, 1129 (1973).
264 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2695 and Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 93 S Ct 1129. 
See also Otty and Olbourne (2004) 
265 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2696-97. 
266 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2698. See also Moeckli (2005) 92. 
267 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2699.  
  
 42
counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing--unquestionably describe 
“custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”’268
 
Justice Scalia, however, sided with the government. He condemned the majority 
decision as ‘judicial adventurism of the worst sort’ that was ‘in frustration of our 
military commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law’.269  
 
In Hamdi the Supreme Court had to rule on the legality of the government’s 
classification and detention of a US citizen as ‘enemy combatant’.270 Furthermore, the 
court had to address the constitutionally owed process to challenge such 
classification.271  
 
A majority of five justices upheld in principle the government’s claim to classify 
US citizens as ‘enemy combatants’ and detain them without charges or trial.272 The 
practice was found to be legal, because it was included in the war time powers granted 
by the congressional authorization to use military force against those responsible for 
9/11.273 The Supreme Court confirmed the administration’s creation of the special 
category of ‘enemy combatants’, which is unknown to international law.274  
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s notion of largely 
unreviewable powers to detain ‘enemy combatants’ without trial.275 The government 
conceded that Hamdi as US citizen was entitled to habeas corpus review, because the 
                                                 
268 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2698 n 15. See also Weisselberg (2005) 855. 
269 Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2711, dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas. 
270 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2635. 
271 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2635. 
272 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2639-40 and 2680.  
273 Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). See for the decision Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2640. See 
also Perkins ‘Habeas corpus in the war against terrorism: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and citizen enemy 
combatants’ (2004-2005)19 Brigham Young University J of Public L 447. 
274 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2639-40. See also Moeckli (2005) 99. 
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by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred 
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the President was authorized to detain Hamdi. See Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2644, 2650 and 2660. 
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writ of habeas corpus had not been suspended.276 However, the government argued 
that due to appropriate judicial deference to the executive’s discretion in national 
security and military affairs judicial review would be satisfied by a ‘some evidence’ 
standard.277 According to this standard a court could only determine whether there was 
any evidence in support of the classification at all, but not assess the factual basis of 
such evidence.278 The only evidence presented and found to be sufficient by the 
government consisted of the Mobbs declaration, which was based on hearsay that 
could not be verified.279  
 
The Supreme Court stroke a balance between the government’s claim to a low 
burden of proof and vast judicial deference and the individual’s right to due process 
under ordinary criminal law, as ordered by the District Court in the first instance.280 
Justice O’Connor rejected the government’s assertion, because the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of liberty under such broad detention powers was too high.281 The value of 
national security did not trump the value of the fundamental liberties at stake, 
especially in times of crisis.282
 
Justice O’Connor, however, acknowledged the extraordinary circumstances of the 
‘war on terrorism’ and also rejected the notion of full due process rights.283 Instead she 
ruled that Hamdi must receive notice of the factual basis of his classification as ‘enemy 
combatant’ and that he must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual 
basis before a neutral decision maker.284 While this process could be performed by a 
properly constituted military tribunal, mere interrogation by the military was 
                                                 
276 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2644. See also Otty and Olbourne (2004) 563. 
277 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2645. See also Perkins (2004-2005) 445. 
278 Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole v Hill, 105 S Ct 2768, 2774 
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279 Mobbs was a Special Advisor to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who declared that Hamdi 
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excluded.285 The plurality opinion also rejected the ‘some evidence’ standard, because 
it would render the individual’s opportunity to refute classification meaningless.286
 
The Supreme Court judgment seemingly attained Hamdi’s release. Following an 
agreement and the administration’s change of mind that he posed no threat to national 
security anymore, Hamdi was set free and deported to Saudi Arabia.287 The 
government did not give any reason for the sudden shift in its evaluation of Hamdi’s 
dangerousness.288 This silence implies that he never posed any threat. 
 
Notwithstanding the court’s rejection of the administration’s claim to be free to 
detain without any judicial review, the actual impact of the judgments might be 
smaller than it seems. Neither Rasul, nor Hamdi specified the standards applicable to 
such judicial review proceedings.289 Utilizing this indeterminacy, the government 
delegated judicial review of ‘enemy combatant’ detentions to Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRT) that were modelled on the Supreme Court decisions.290  
 
These tribunals do not meet international minimum standards of independence, 
competency and fairness.291 All participants come from the military, judges as well as 
defence counsel.292 Furthermore, the CSRT may decide only whether the designation 
was wrong, but have no power to order release in such a case.293 Detainee’s rights are 
hampered by their possible partial exclusion from proceedings on national security 
grounds,294 their limited right to call witnesses,295 the admissibility of hearsay,296 and 
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a rebuttable presumption in favour of the government’s evidence.297 After the CSRT 
finished its first round of hearings 38 detainees were released, while the rest was 
confirmed to be ‘enemy combatants’.298
 
The CSRT are, however, not the last word. The detainees may also appeal to civil 
courts to challenge their detention in habeas corpus proceedings. Given the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, civil courts can only review the merits of each case. This favours the 
government, since it will be difficult for the defence to acquire exculpatory evidence 
from the confusion of far away battlefields and events that happened more than three 
years ago.299 Moreover, the government seems to use the CSRT outcomes as evidence 
in such proceedings.300  
 
The case of Padilla concerned the most far reaching assertion of executive power: 
the indefinite detention without trial of a US citizen captured on American soil.301 This 
power would equal the breakdown of the rule of law, since it would allow to detain 
any terrorist suspect, however unattached to an armed conflict or battlefield.302 The 
Supreme Court, however, remanded the case on technical grounds, because the habeas 
corpus petition was filed in the wrong court.303 The immediate custodian, that is the 
Commander of the Navy Brig where Padilla was held, was found to be the proper 
respondent and not the Secretary of Defense.304 Accordingly, the petition must be filed 
in District Court of South Carolina, which had jurisdiction over the immediate 
custodian, instead of the District Court of New York.305  
 
The US Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, ruled on the newly filed petition that the 
President had the power to detain US citizens indefinitely as ‘enemy combatants’ 
                                                 
297 US Department of Defense, Order establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals para (g)(12). 
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under the congressional authorization to use force and that this power was vital to 
enable the President to protect the nation from terrorist attacks.306 Hence, it reversed 
District court’s finding that Padilla’s detention had no basis in law.307
 
While it was expected that the case would go to the Supreme Court for appeal,308 
Padilla was indicted for conspiracy of murder, kidnap and maim persons in a foreign 
country and conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists in September 2005.309 
The charges do not, however, refer to the initial allegations that Padilla planned to 
explode a ‘dirty bomb’. After more than four years of detention without trial Padilla 
will be given proper trial determining his guilt or innocence. In January 2006, the 
Supreme Court ordered on application of the Solicitor General Padilla’s transfer from 
military custody to civilian custody in order to face criminal charges contained in the 
indictment.310
 
In summary, the judiciary’s record of opinio iuris remains ambiguous. While it 
rejected the claim of unreviewable discretion to detain, the Supreme Court went along 
with the executive’s claim that it were entitled to designate ‘enemy combatants’ and 
detain them as long as hostilities in the ‘war on terror’ continue, hence indefinitely.  
 
3.2. United Kingdom 
 The USA’s closest ally in the ‘war on terrorism’ also resorted to indefinite 
detention without trial as response to the perceived new threat, despite its poor record 
using this means of counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1975.311 The 
UK, however, did not employ the ‘enemy combatant’ approach, but resorted to 
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immigration law to detain terrorist suspects. In doing so, its approach resembles the 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act.312  
 
3.2.1. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
The British legislative response to 9/11 targeted only non-citizens, since it was 
rooted in immigration law.313 The detention process under the ATCSA was triggered 
by the Secretary of State’s certification that he reasonably believes that an alien is a 
threat to national security or suspects that an alien is a terrorist.314  
 
‘Terrorism’ is defined as the use or threat of serious violent action against persons 
or property, action that creates a serious risk to public health and safety or seriously 
interferes with an electronic system.315 Additionally, the threat or use of such action 
must be designed to influence the government or public of any state in pursuance of a 
political, religious or ideological cause.316 A person qualifies as ‘terrorist’ if he or she 
is or has been actively involved in acts of international terrorism,317 is a member of, or 
supports or assists an international terrorist group.318  
 
Upon certification, a non-citizen ‘terrorist’ could be detained without charge or 
trial for an indefinite period of time, if deportation was barred by legal or practical 
reasons.319 Legal reasons encompassed the prospect of torture and inhuman treatment 
or the death penalty in the receiving state, in which case deportation would have been 
violating the UK’s obligations under the EuCHR.320 Practical reasons included the 
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lack of a state willing to receive the ‘terrorist’ or the lack of travel documents.321 
Detainees were, however, able to end their detention at any time by agreeing to leave 
the country.322
 
The ATCSA provided for the right of appeal to the ‘terrorist’ certification,323 as 
well as mandatory review thereof.324 The sole tribunal dealing with appeal and review 
was the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).325 SIAC is presided over 
by a judge and its other members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. SIAC may 
therefore be called independent.326 SIAC could order the cancellation of a ‘terrorist’ 
certification after reviewing the merits, namely when it found that there were no 
reasonable grounds for the Secretary of State’s suspicion.327 While this suggested 
adequate competency to order release, the Secretary of State could circumvent 
cancellation by the issuance of a new certificate.328
 
SIAC’s proceedings are civil and restrict the detainee’s right to participate in oral 
hearings and calling witnesses.329 Furthermore, counsel may be assigned and the 
detainee excluded from SIAC proceedings.330 Hence, criticism was raised with regard 
to the fairness and appropriateness of SIAC’s procedures since it was designed to 
review deportation cases and not decisions on indefinite detention.331 Instead, the 
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safeguards of criminal process would have been more appropriate to the seriousness of 
such a grave infringement of the right to liberty like indefinite detention.332
 
The Secretary of State has certified and detained seventeen persons under ATCSA, 
relying on classified intelligence reports.333 Two of them left the country voluntarily, 
one person has been released, another one has been released on bail due to his 
deteriorated state of mental health334 and one person was detained in a secure mental 
hospital.335 The rest were held at high security prisons.336 Although the dimension of 
preventive detention practices and norms in the UK was less grave than in the USA,337 
they were still draconic and contravened international human rights standards, since 
they permitted indefinite detention based on the executive’s mere suspicion justified 
on a low burden of proof, in secret proceedings and based on dubious intelligence.338
 
3.2.2. Justification: derogation from human rights treaties 
The UK government, however, acknowledged this contravention and tried to 
circumvent it by availing itself of the right to derogate according to art 4 ICCPR and 
art 15 EuCHR.339 The UK fulfilled the procedural requirements of official 
proclamation of a state of emergency and timely notification of the relevant organs, 
including sufficient information about the emergency, the derogated provisions and the 
reasons therefore.340 While the notifications did not designate a possible end of the 
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state of emergency, the UK indicated that the domestic norms necessitating the 
derogation are temporary in nature.341 The relevant provisions authorising indefinite 
detention without trial342 was set to expire after an initial period of 15 months.343 
Thereafter, it would have been up to the Parliament to renew the provision annually.344  
 
The UK government has abided by its obligations under international human rights 
treaties, at least procedurally.345 One factor for that may have been its membership in 
the regional European human rights system, whose court can enforce human rights in 
member states by legally binding judgments.346 Hence, the UK faced higher pressure 
than the USA, should it not play by the rules.347
 
The UK’s reasoning, however, resembles the arguments brought forward by the 
USA. Although the UK did not argue that it was at ‘war’ with terrorism,348 it stated a 
threat to its national security and the life of the nation, caused by foreign nationals’ 
presence in its territory, who were involved in international terrorism.349 The UK 
administration also emphasized the novelty of the dangers of global terrorism.350  
 
Detention without trial of aliens was also justified as being necessary to contain 
the perceived threat of international terrorism.351 The detention powers under ATCSA 
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were deemed necessary to close a gap in British law, which would tie the 
administration’s hands in protecting the nation from the new threat.352 Without the 
power, the UK could not have done anything against suspected foreign nationals, when 
there were either said obstacles to deportation or not enough evidence to initiate 
criminal proceedings.353
 
3.2.3. The judiciary: the House of Lords decision in A v Secretary of State of 
the Home Department354
When litigation over the derogation’s compatibility with the EuCHR reached the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords after three years, the bench ‘rode a coach 
and horses’355 through the policy of indefinite detention without trial of aliens. 
 
In the first place, the majority of the court upheld the government’s determination 
of a state of emergency.356 Their reasoning stressed the pre-eminently political 
character of a declaration of emergency and the following derogation.357 Such a 
political question rightly fell into the competence of the political organs that is the 
executive and the parliament.358  
 
The House of Lords disagreed with the government’s assertion that the detention 
powers were strictly required by the situation.359 The court ruled that the measure was 
unnecessary and disproportionate. Because it only targeted non-nationals, s 23 of the 
ATCSA did not offer protection from the similar threat of international terrorists who 
were British nationals.360 Furthermore, the law allowed terrorist suspects to escape 
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detention by leaving the country, enabling them to pursue their activities from 
abroad.361  
 
The House of Lords also found that indefinite detention of non-citizens was 
discriminatory and as such prohibited by international law.362 The different treatment 
of alien and ‘British’ international terrorists constituted an unlawful discrimination, 
which violated art 14 EuCHR363 and art 4 ICCPR.364 Discrimination based on 
nationality in this case was found to be as irrational as discrimination based on 
religion, colour or sex.365 According to this reasoning, nationality could not indicate 
the dangerousness of a person at all. 
 
This landmark judgment implied that indefinite detention under s 23 of the 
ATCSA amounted to arbitrary detention prohibited by international law, because of its 
lack of necessity, its disproportionality and its discriminatory nature. Accordingly, the 
House of Lords quashed the derogation order and declared the incompatibility of the 
ATCSA detention powers.366 On 16 March and 8 April 2005 respectively, the 
Parliament repealed both the provision and the order.367 The court could not, however, 
order the release of the detainees.368 The last eight detainees were released on bail 
including conditions of electronic tagging and curfews in March 2005.369
 
The detention powers were replaced with less intrusive measures such as house 
arrest, restrictions on movement or place of residence and imposing reporting 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4338849.stm (accessed on 11 February 2006). 
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duties.370 It should further be noted that post-9/11 legislation extended the permissible 
period of pre-trial detention in ordinary criminal cases involving suspicion of terrorism 
from seven up to fourteen days.371 This change in law raises serious concerns 
regarding the prohibition of arbitrary detention372 and, moreover, is permanent, since it 




The third state reviewed is involved in the core conflict of the Middle East, which 
is also the underlying conflict for Arab-islamic terrorism. Israel experienced terrorist 
violence from the beginning of its existence, while its present-day territory was 
plagued by terrorism even before that date.374 Since the al-Aqsa intifada commenced 
in 2000, Israel is one of the terrorism hotspots in the world, with suicide bombings 
being a common daily threat.375
 
3.3.1. The Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 
Despite the fact that Israel was under heavy terrorist fire, a bill allowing indefinite 
detention of designated ‘unlawful combatants’ stalled in the Knesset in 2000, due to 
heavy local and international criticism.376 The bill was reintroduced in early 2002, 
shortly after the USA announced its policy of treating Guantanamo detainees as 
‘unlawful combatants’.377 This time, the law passed the Knesset and was adopted in 
                                                 
370 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 s 4. See also Ramraj, Hor and Roach (2005) 626-27. 
371 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 306. See also Dickson (2005) 24. 
372 In Brogan v UK (1988) 11 EHRR 114 the EurCtHR found a period of six days and four hours of 
administrative detention without possibility to challenge detention in violation of art 5(3) of the EuCHR. 
373 Dickson (2005) 24. 
374 See for a brief history Bhoumik (2005) 321-23. 
375 Cf Schulhofer ‘Checks and balances in wartime: American, British and Israeli experiences’ (2004) 
102 Michigan LR 1931. 
376 Mariner ‘Indefinite detention of terrorist suspects’ (2002b) Find Law‘s Writ, 10 June 2002 and 
Human Rights Watch ‘Israel: opportunistic law condemned’ (2002a) 7 March 2002. See for the 
background of the bill  
377 Mariner (2002b) and Human Rights Watch (2002a). See also Cainkar ‘Introduction: global impacts 
of September 11’ (2004) 24 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 159.  
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March 2002, leaving way to the observation that Israeli decision makers hopped on the 
American ‘war on terrorism’ train to reach this result.378
 
An ‘unlawful combatant’ is defined as a person, who has participated, directly or 
indirectly, in hostile acts against Israel or a person, who is a member of a force 
perpetrating hostile acts against Israel.379 This is again an overly broad definition, 
which would for example include a person working in a medical hospital run by 
Hamas.380 The legally binding designation, whether a particular force is engaged in 
hostile acts against Israel and whether hostile activity has ceased or not, is incumbent 
upon the Minister of Defence.381 The law is applicable to anyone, regardless of 
citizenship or nationality.382  
 
The power to detain is vested in the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF), who may order the detention of a person if he or she believes 
on a reasonable cause standard that a person is an unlawful combatant and release will 
harm state security.383 The detainee must be informed of the grounds for the detention 
as soon as possible and is granted to make a submission challenging the order.384 This 
first right to challenge detention is meaningless, since the review of the submission is 
conducted by the Chief of General Staff, the same person that ordered the detention in 
the first place.385  
 
Judicial review before a District Court judge must be awarded within fourteen 
days after the order has been issued.386 The court is competent to quash the 
incarceration order, if it determines that the person is no unlawful combatant or if 
                                                 
378 Gregory ‘Palestine and the “war on terror”’ (2004) 24 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East 192. 
379 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law (IUCL), 5762-2002 art 2. 
380 Btselem.org Position paper on the proposed law: Imprisonment of Illegal Combatants (2000) 4. 
381 The Minister’s decision shall be regarded sufficient proof in any legal proceedings, unless proved 
otherwise. See IUCL, 5762-2002 art 8 and Btselem.org (2000) 5-6. 
382 Btselem.org (2000) 1. 
383 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 3(a). 
384 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 3(a) and (c). See also Btselem.org (2000) 2. 
385 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 3(c). 
386 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(a). 
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release will not harm state security.387 Based on the latter finding or other special 
grounds, the District Court judge may cancel the detention order in mandatory 
biannual review proceedings.388 Appeals to the District Court’s judgment may be 
brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.389  
 
Judicial review hearings under this law must, however, generally be closed to the 
public (in camera).390 The law permits withholding of evidence from the defence on 
grounds of state or public security391 and the appointment of counsel by the state.392 
Furthermore, the burden of proof is shifted to the detainee, since the law presumes that 
the release of any designated unlawful combatant is per se deemed harmful to state 
security, unless proved otherwise.393  
 
The Israeli law resembles the substance of the US’ ‘enemy combatant’ approach, 
that is the unilateral administrative designation of a category, which does not exist in 
international law, and resulting in indefinite detention for designated individuals. The 
Israeli law also causes the same problems with regard to minimum standards of 
international law, since it likewise permits preventive detention on the executive’s say 
so, with proper judicial review hampered by limitations on fair procedure. 
 
3.3.2. Justification: persisting state of emergency 
Art 1 of the IUCL emphasizes that it  
 
‘is intended to regulate the incarceration of unlawful combatants not entitled to 
prisoner-of-war status, in a manner conforming with the obligations of the State of Israel 
under the provisions of international humanitarian law.’ 
 
                                                 
387 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(a). 
388 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(c). See also Btselem.org (2000) 2. 
389 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(d). 
390 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(f). 
391 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 5(e). 
392 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 6(b). 
393 IUCL, 5762-2002 art 7. See also Btselem.org (2000) 5. 
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It is, however, not discernable, how the unilateral creation of a special category 
unknown to it, can be in conformity with international humanitarian law.394  
 
While the general justification for indefinite detention is similar to the US 
reasoning of exceptional circumstances, state of emergency and necessity of the 
measure, the case of Israel also indicates the permanence of the exception. With regard 
to international human rights law, Israel has entered a reservation to art 9 to the 
ICCPR, exempting it from the prohibition of arbitrary detention.395 The reason 
therefore was that Israel deemed itself in a persisting state of emergency.396
 
3.3.3. The Judiciary: between deference and progress 
The judiciary has not yet voiced dissent with the IUCL. It remains to be seen in 
which direction the courts will head: will they fall back to their general deference 
towards the executive in matters of national security?397 Or will the judiciary maintain 
its progressive trend that everything is justiciable?398 In the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision prohibiting the use of torture by security forces in any circumstances in 
Public Committee Against Torture v Israel399 Justice Barak commented famously, that 
 
‘[t]his is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, 
and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must 
sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the 
upper hand.’400
 
                                                 
394 Cf Btselem.org (2000) 4. 
395 The reservation is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm (accessed on 6 
Februray 2006) See also Gross (2001) 765. An examination of the validity of the reservation would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. See generally on reservations to human rights treaties Korkelia ‘New 
challenges to the regime of reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
(2002) 13 European J of International L 437 and Coccia ‘Reservations to multilateral treaties on human 
rights’ (1985) 15 California Western International LJ 1.  
396 See the reservation (fn 395 above). See also Gross (2001) 765. 
397 See Schulhofer (2004)1923 and Gross (2001) 758-61. 
398 Zharzhevski v Prime Minister, HC 1635/90, 48(1) PD 749, 855-57. See also Schulhofer (2004) 1923 
and Gross (2001) 758. 
399 HCJ 5100/94 (1999) 53(4) PD 817. 
400 Public Committee Against Torture v Israel, 53(4) PD 817, 37. 
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Recently, the Supreme Court struck down a military order that allowed for 
detention without trial for up to eighteen days of ‘unlawful combatants’ captured in the 
West Bank.401 While the executive claimed national security arguments similar to 
those of the US government, the Supreme Court found that fundamental human rights 
required prompt review of detention by an independent judicial authority.402 The 
Supreme Court ruled that even an alleged unlawful combatant had to be brought 
promptly before a judge.403 While the court conceded that arrests made in combat 
zones warrant delays, judicial review had to commence within 48 hours after the 
detainee has been removed from the combat zone, because the practical constraints of 
warfare are no longer relevant after removal.404
 
These judgments suggest that the Israeli judiciary is assuming a strong and 
independent role towards the executive’s national security measures. In practice, 
however, judgments are still highly deferential.405 Although courts do review 
detentions on their merits, suspects are rarely released.406
 
3.4. Other countries 
The employment of detention without trial as anti-terrorism measure is not 
confined to the three cases surveyed above. A number of other countries from all over 
the world have introduced laws empowering the executive to detain terrorist 
suspects.407 These approaches show similarities in their substance as well as in their 
justification, although they may differ in dimension and scope.408  
 
                                                 
401 Marab v IDF Commander in the West Bank, 57(2) PD 349. See on the order Schulhofer (2004) 1922-
23. 
402 Marab v IDF Commander in the West Bank, 57(2) PD 349 para 31.  
403 Marab v IDF Commander in the West Bank, 57(2) PD 349 paras 26 and 27.  
404 Marab v IDF Commander in the West Bank, 57(2) PD 349 paras 30 and 46. See also Schulhofer 
(2004) 1928-29. 
405 Schulhofer (2004) 1925. 
406 Schulhofer (2004) 1925. 
407 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Assessing the new normal: liberty and security for the post-
September 11 United States (2003) 75. 
408 Cf Jimeno-Bulnes (2004) 237. 
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States permitting indefinite detention on executive say-so include such diverse 
countries as Egypt and Canada. In February 2003, Egypt extended an emergency law 
set to expire in May 2003, which permits the government to detain persons believed to 
be a threat to national security for 45 days without charge.409 In fact, the law allows for 
indefinite detention, since the 45-day period is infinitely renewable.410 The power has 
been used in Egypt frequently.411 The Egyptian Prime Minister justified the extension 
of detention powers with its urgent necessity in the ongoing ‘war on terrorism’.412 
Furthermore, he cited US and British practices and norms regarding indefinite 
detention in support, which adopted principles adhered to in Egyptian emergency 
law.413  
 
Canada resorts to indefinite detention without trial under its immigration laws,414 
targeting non-nationals in two ways. Firstly, an alien may be detained by an 
immigration officer, if he or she is deemed a danger to the public on reasonable 
grounds415 Initial review of the reasons for detention is due after 48 hours, but is 
conducted by the Immigration Division itself rather than an independent court.416 
Thereafter, detention must be reviewed by the Immigration Division every thirty days 
and may be renewed indefinitely.417  
 
Secondly, the Ministers of Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness respectively may certify a non-national on security 
grounds418 and warrant the person’s temporally unlimited detention.419 Both the 
                                                 
409 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) 75 and Human Rights (2003) 12. 
410 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) 75 and Human Rights Watch (2003) 12. 
411 Human Rights Watch (2003) 12. 
412 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) 75. 
413 President Mubarak said in December 2001 that ‘[t]here is no doubt that the events of September 11 
created a new concept of democracy that differs from the concept that Western states defended before 
these events, especially in regard to the freedom of the individual.’ See Human Rights Watch (2003) 12. 
See also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) 75-76. 
414 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 27 (IRPA).
415 IRPA s 55. 
416 IRPA s 57(1). See also Roach ‘Canada’s response to terrorism’ in Ramraj, Hor and Roach Global 
anti-terrorism law and policy (2005) 523. 
417 IRPA s 57(2). See also Roach (2005) 523. 
418 IRPA s 77(1). 
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certification and the detention are subject to review by the Federal Court, with initial 
review of the latter due after 48 hours and biannually thereafter.420 However, fair 
proceedings are hampered by the executive’s right to withhold evidence for reasons of 
national security.421
 
Both methods of indefinite detention without trial were used in some cases.422 
Indefinite detention under a security certificate was upheld by the Federal Court of 
Appeal, because ‘the threat of terrorism […] does not represent a situation of 
normality, at least not in our country.’423  
 
Other states resorted to detention without trial, but limited the permissible duration 
of detention. For example, Pakistan adopted a new Anti-Terrorism Ordinance in 
November 2002, which authorizes the detention of terrorist suspects for the maximum 
period of one year without charge or trial.424 Almost the same lengthy period for 
detention without trial is envisaged in Uganda. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 defines 
terrorism broadly and turns terrorism into a capital offence, over which the Ugandan 
High Court has exclusive jurisdiction.425 The Ugandan constitution allows detention 
without trial of up to 360 days in cases over which the High Court has the sole 
jurisdiction.426 Read in combination, suspected terrorists may be subjected to 
preventive detention for almost a year.  
                                                                                                                                             
419 If they have reasonable grounds ‘to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to national 
security or to the safety of any person’. IRPA s 82(1). 
420 IRPA ss 83(1) and (2). 
421 Roach (2005) 524-25. 
422 Roach (2005) 523-24 and 526. See also Ramraj, Hor and Roach (2005) 628. 
423 Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FCA 421 para 84. However, 
Charkaoui was released after 21months of detention without trial, because his dangerousness was found 
to have been neutralized. Nevertheless, his release was subject to strict conditions, such as bail of 50000 
CAN$, movement restrictions, surrender of his passport and other travel documents and a prohibition to 
use cell phones or computers. See Re Charkaoui 2005 FC 248 paras 77, 85 and 86. See also Ramraj, 
Hor and Roach (2005) 628-29. 
424 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) 75. 
425 Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 s 7. For example, the definition expressly includes inter alia illegal import 
or sale of firearms and illegal possession of explosives or ammunition See also Bossa and Mulindwa 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (Uganda): human rights concerns and implications, paper presented to 
the International Commission of Jurists, 15 September 2004 1-2. 
426 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, adopted 22 September 1995 s 23(6)(c). Sufficient evidence 
needs to be available just after the 360 day period. Although the prosecutor must bring the detainee 




Finally, a third group of states maintains detention powers that seem rather modest 
in the first place, but still contravene minimum standards of international human rights 
law. Japan, for example, allows detention of up to 23 days until an indictment must be 
made.427 Indonesia introduced anti-terrorism powers authorizing 7 days of detention 
without trial on grounds of strong suspicion based on preliminary evidence, which may 
consist of intelligence reports.428
 
4. Towards a new rule? –detention without trial in the ‘war on terrorism’ and its 
effects on international law 
 
The usage of detention without trial, sometimes indefinitely, in current anti-
terrorism efforts contravenes existing rules of international law. While attempts to hide 
violations of international law norms tend to reinforce their authority,429 the pattern of 
detention without trial depicted above was exercised and even justified in public. This 
public display may dilute the authority of existing rules and lead to new rules, which 
render the existing ones obsolete. This chapter examines the question, whether the 
pattern of detention without trial in the current ‘war against terrorism’ diminishes the 
value of the existing norm prohibiting such detention: Are we heading towards a new 
rule? 
 
4.1. The process of norm changing in international customary law 
International customary law is generally formed by constant, uniform state 
practice and opinio iuris, which means a sense of legal obligation.430 Only practice 
                                                                                                                                             
to grant further remand. See Human Rights Watch State of pain: torture in Uganda (2004) vol 16 no 
4(A) 16 and 67-68. 
427 Fenwick ‘Japan’s response to terrorism post-9/11’ in Ramraj, Hor and Roach Global anti-terrorism 
law and policy (2005) 333. 
428 Anti-Terrorism Law no 15/2003 arts 26 and 28. See also Juwana ‘Indonesia’s anti-terrorism law’ in 
Ramraj, Hor and Roach Global anti-terrorism law and policy (2005) 298. 
429 Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) (1986) ICJ Rep 98. 
430 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat 1031 (1945) art 38(1)(b) and Asylum Case 
(Columbia v Peru) 1950 ICJ Rep 276-77. See also Brierly The law of nations: an introduction to the 
international law of peace s (1963) 59 and Brownlie Principles of public international law (2003) 7-10. 
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accompanied by such a legal belief is relevant.431 Evidence for state practice and 
opinio iuris can be found in treaties, court decisions and domestic legislation, 
diplomatic correspondence and the practice of international organizations.432 
Executive acts and statements and orders to military and naval forces may also indicate 
evidence for state practice and opinio iuris.433  
 
The formation of custom is accomplished through an active and a passive 
component. The active part involves states who engage in certain behaviour, based on 
their belief that such behaviour is lawful. Omission, however, may also constitute 
action in a negative way, showing that states feel obliged not to engage in certain 
behaviour. States, which remain passive, may legitimize the activity of other states by 
way of acquiescence, that is to demonstrate implied consent by staying silent.434 The 
formation of customary rules involves a temporal element demanding that the usage is 
repeated over time.435  
 
Proof of rules of international customary law is often difficult, given the ambiguity 
of state actions and, even more so, the uncertainty of what states believe to be legal 
obligation.436 Problems also arise with regard to uniformity of practice and the number 
of states participating: How much usage by what number of states suffices to establish 
a norm?437  
 
                                                 
431 For example, practice based on comity must be excluded. An example is diplomatic etiquette which 
has been adhered to by states for centuries, but only out of practical reasons and comity rather than out 
of legal obligation. Hence, diplomatic etiquette creates no legal effect or rule. See Byers Custom, power 
and the power of rules: international relations and customary international law (1999) 18-19, 149 and 
212. 
432 Akehurst ‘Custom as a source of international law’ (1974-1975) 47 British Yearbook of International 
L 1-10. See also American Law Institute (1987) para 103. 
433 Brownlie (2003) 6. 
434 See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) 1951 ICJ Rep 138-39. 
435 Byers (1999) 160-62. 
436 See, for example, France´s task to show opinio iuris of states not acting (abstaining from the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction in cases of ship collisions), which is merely impossible. See Lotus Case (France 
v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ 3, 28. 
437 Byers ‘Power, obligation, and customary international law’ (2001) 11 Duke J of Comparative & 
International L 83-84. 
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The answer cannot be given in absolute terms.438 The scale of state practice and 
expressions of opinio iuris are correlated and add up to establish customary rules.439 
Mere state practice without opinio iuris is insufficient as well as mere opinio iuris 
without any correlating usage.440 Instead, both of them need to be evident, but may be 
inversely correlated.441 Accordingly, a high degree of one element may compensate for 
a low degree of the other.442 A certain threshold must, however, be met by state 
practice and opinio iuris before a norm can be considered being part of international 
customary law. 
 
An inverse correlation also exists between consistency of the usage and its 
repetition over time.443 ‘Extensive and virtually uniform’ state practice may create or 
change a customary rule only after a very short period elapsed.444 Some writers also 
suggest the possibility of ‘instant’ customary law.445
 
The process of international customary law is, however, not democratic. There is 
no such equality principle of ‘one state, one vote’ like in the UN General Assembly in 
this process.446 Instead, two factors add to the weight given to a state’s behaviour in 
the customary process.  
 
                                                 
438 Cf Byers (1999) 5.                                                                                                                                                                    
439 Kirgis ‘Custom on a sliding scale’ (1987) 81 American J of International L 146-51. 
440 An example for the former is diplomatic etiquette. An example for the latter would be a rule, which 
may be accepted as such, but is never used in practice. 
441 See the sliding scale of Kirgis (1987) 150. 
442 Kirgis (1987) 149. 
443 Charlesworth ‘Customary international law and the Nicaragua Case’ (1984-1987) 11 Australian 
Yearbook of International L 7.  
444 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 ICJ Rep 43. See also Charlesworth (1984-87) 7 and Byers 
(1999) 160-61. 
445 Cheng ‘United Nations resolutions on outer space: “Instant” international customary law?’ (1965) 5 
Indian J of International L 23 and Langille ‘It's “instant custom”: how the Bush Doctrine became law 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001’ (2003) 26 Boston College International and 
Comparative LR 149-51. See also Byers (1999) 160. 
446 Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) art 18(1). Cf also Byers (2001) 82-83. 
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Firstly, states with a special interest, that is, which are especially affected by an 
issue to be regulated, gain more significance than states with a lesser interest.447 The 
second factor increasing a state’s weight in the customary process is power, as Kelsen 
stated: 
 
‘[I]n fact, in order to be able to consider that a norm is applicable in state 
practice as a norm of customary international law, it is enough if it has been applied 
or recognized in numerous cases by those states which by reason of their size and 
their culture are the most important for the development of international law.’448
 
 
The significance of powerful states has not only developed historically,449 but may 
also be derived from functional considerations: powerful states are in a comparatively 
better position to effectively display state practice and their belief of what the law 
is.450 They can act much more effectively, since they possess the means to act with 
great frequency on the international plane, to impose their will and thereby shape 
customary rules.451
 
 De Visscher illustrated the customary process as the gradual formation of a path 
across vacant land, among whose users there  
 
                                                 
447 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 ICJ Rep 43. See also Stern (2001) 103. Landlocked states 
have, for example, significantly lesser weight in customary law regarding marine delimitation or fishery 
than coastal states. 
448 Kelsen Théorie pure du droit (Eisenmann, translated 1962) 260-61 cited in Stern (2001) 104. 
449 The customary law of the sea, for example, was largely created by the British Empire in the 19th 
century which at that time was the only superpower. See Brown ‘Law of the sea, history’ in Bernhardt 
Encyclopedia of public international law (2000) vol 3 170. 
450 Byers (1999) 37. 
451 For example, American state organs such as troops act on the international plane daily in multiple 
ways, thereby creating state practice, whereas a small and poor country like Tuvalu may find it much 
harder to act. Furthermore, powerful states maintain far bigger diplomatic staffs to represent their 
attitudes and beliefs bilaterally and in multilateral organisations, let alone their better capabilities to 
enforce their rights. See Akehurst (1974-1975) 23 and Byers (2001) 84. Cf also Stern (2001) 108. 
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‘are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than 
others, either because of their weight, which is to say their power in this world, or 
because their interests bring them more frequently this way.’452
 
The above mentioned factors contribute to the emergence of a new rule in 
international customary law. To become valid, a rule needs to have sufficient support, 
whether active in constant and repeated usage and expressions of opinio iuris or 
passive in form of acquiescence.453 Opposition and resistance, on the other hand, may 
prevent the emergence of a rule, depending on the nature and scale of support and 
objection.454
 
Norm change follows the same process with one significant difference: a rule is 
already in place. In the case of an emerging adversary rule, this means that the existing 
rule must be breached a priori.455 Repeated violation of the existing rule, accompanied 
by a belief of legal entitlement, may lead to the replacement of the old rule.456 
Objections to the emerging rule may, however, prevent replacement and preserve the 
existing rule.457 This ‘derogating power of international customary law’458 may render 
not only existing customary norms obsolete, but also norms of international treaty 
law.459 An emerging norm does not necessarily have to substitute the old rule in its 
entirety. It may also modify parts of the old rule or create an exception. 
 
States shape the rules of international law, either by the way of custom or treaty, in 
the constantly moving and evolving landscape of international law. Rules are 
constantly created, modified, abandoned or replaced. In principle, no rule is sacrosanct 
                                                 
452 De Visscher Theory and reality in public international law (1968) 154-55. See also Byers (2001) 84. 
453 Indifference has a supporting effect, because indifferent states do not mind the rule coming into 
effect. 
454 If a rule comes into being which has general support, single states may ‘persistently object’ to this 
rule with the effect that they are not bound by it. See on the problem of ‘persistent objectors’ Akehurst 
(1974-1975) 23-27 and Byers (1999) 102-05. 
455 Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) (1986) ICJ Rep 109. See also Ipsen Völkerrecht (1999) 196. 
456 Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v US) (1986) ICJ Rep 109. See also Ipsen (1999) 196-97. 
457 Analogous to the objection preventing the emergence of an altogether new rule. See Byers (1999) 
102-03. 
458 Ipsen (1999) 196. 
459 See Capotorti ‘L’extinction et la suspension des traités’ (1971) 134 III Recueil des cours 516-20 and 
Ipsen (1999) 179. Cf also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 64. 
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and unchangeable, if an overwhelming majority of states decides so, since there is no 
higher authority above them.460  
 
Compliance with international customary law is secured by the principle of 
reciprocity.461 States are rights bearers as well as duty bearers and adhere to norms 
because they expect others to do the same.462 A state which claims a right under 
international customary law must grant the same right to any other state.463 
Furthermore, if a state breaches a rule, it faces coercive self-help measures by states 
who feel that they suffered a wrong.464  
 
In human rights law, states are only duty bearers, because they owe the rights to 
individuals.465 In case of breach the wrong is suffered by individuals rather than by 
other states. Hence, the principle of reciprocity is weakened significantly in the case of 
human rights, which makes them more vulnerable to change. 
 
Legal scholars have tried to remedy this problem by suggesting a stronger role for 
international organisations, governmental as well as non-governmental, in the 
customary process.466 International governmental organisations and their agencies 
might gain legal significance in the customary norm-creation process, because their 
actions constitute collective state action.467 Statements of international governmental 
organisations, which are not legally binding need to be confirmed by individual state 
actions to gain legal significance in the customary process.468 Otherwise they represent 
mere political statements. 
 
                                                 
460 Even peremptory norms of international law (ius cogens) may be changed, albeit only by norms of 
the same hierarchical status. See fn 136 above. 
461 Simma ‘Reciprocity’ in Bernhardt Encyclopedia of public international law (2000) vol 4 29-30. 
462 Simma (2000) 29-30. 
463 Byers (1999) 90. 
464 Kelsen (1960) 321-324 and Simma (2000) 32. 
465 Cf Gunning ‘Moderinizing customary international law: the challenge of human rights’ (1991) 31 
Virginia J of International L 211. 
466 Gunning (1991) 221. 
467 Gunning (1991) 222-23. 
468 Gunning (1991) 223. 
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Although non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may in fact exercise 
considerable influence on the creation of international customary law, this influence 
can only ever be indirect and must be channelled through the states.469 The influence 
of NGOs on norm creation is accordingly a matter of political science rather than 
international law. If there has been a trend to increase the significance of international 
organisations in the customary process, this was reversed by the resurrection of state 
centric relations (‘Wiedererstarken des Staates’) caused by the events of 9/11.470
4.2. What would the new rule be? 
When a new rule emerges, this rule needs to be articulated and identified to prove 
the rule’s validity and, in the case of substitution, to compare its validity with the old 
rule. Accordingly, the question of what the new rule would be must precede the 
examination of whether we are heading towards a new rule in international law.  
 
In the case of detention without trial and terrorism, the practice violating the 
existing rule was started by the USA. While detention without trial was used in anti-
terrorism before, the resolute advocacy of the world’s single super power endowed 
detention practices with new legitimacy. The example given by the ‘shining city upon 
a hill’471 was actively followed by many other states as shown above. 
 
States violated the prohibition of arbitrary detention established in international 
human rights and humanitarian law repeatedly and openly. The prohibition 
encompasses detention without trial, when minimum standards of judicial review are 
not adhered to. Other states also adopted US justifications for the adverse practice, 
hence displaying their belief that they were legally entitled to act as they did. In the 
metaphor of de Visscher, the USA stamped out a new path with its giant feet on which 
                                                 
469 Cf Gunning (1991) 227-30. 
470 See Spanger Die Wiederkehr des Staates: Staatszerfall als wissenschaftliches und 
entwicklungspolitisches Problem (2002) HSFK-Report 1/2002 1-3. The administration of US President 
Bush is a paradigmatic example for this reverse trend. Pre-9/11 the government drifted lacking 
direction, whereas it acted with strong determination after 9/11. 
471 For example, the former President Ronald Reagan emphasized that ‘America is a shining city upon a 
hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere’. See 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=America_is_a_shining_city_upon_a_hill (accessed on 13 
February 2006). See also and more generally Davis and Lynn-Jones ‘City upon a hill’ (1987) 66 
Foreign Policy 20-38. 
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the others could follow.472 The more the well paved path of detention without trial in 
the ‘war on terrorism’ was used by others, the more the old path prohibiting detention 
without trial would be abandoned and go rack and ruin.  
 
The assumed new rule in this case does not render the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention per se obsolete, but rather creates an exception to the existing rule. The 
executive either pushed empowering laws through the legislative process or adopted 
executive decrees permitting detention. On executive officials is bestowed the 
competence to certify or designate persons belonging to a special category, however 
that is called. The threshold for such an administrative decision is low. Reasonable 
belief or suspicion on the respective executive official’s side is sufficient proof. Belief 
may be based on intelligence or even hearsay, rather than a chain of evidence based on 
proven facts. Moreover, conditions for designation are extremely vague, which offers 
the designator a wide margin of appreciation and leads to arbitrary and indiscernible 
results.473
 
Consequences of designation are, however, harsh, since it strips individuals of 
some, if not all, of their rights and puts them into what was called a ‘legal 
blackhole’.474 One consequence is prolonged or even indefinite detention.475 Detainees 
are deprived of the right to personal liberty without being charged of an offence and 
having their guilt established under minimum standards of due process. Access to 
counsel, the opportunity to defend themselves and to appeal against the executive’s 
decision before an independent and competent tribunal, are seriously hampered, if not 
denied altogether. The judicial organs are circumvented and the rule of law is replaced 
by administrative discretion, which is driven politically rather than legally. Detainees 
                                                 
472 Cf ch 4.1. above. 
473 In the USA some US citizens captured in Afghanistan were subjected to regular criminal 
proceedings, while others were declared ‘enemy combatants’. Cf Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
(2003) iii. 
474 See Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth (2002) EWCA Civ 1598 para 64. 
See also Klug ‘The rule of law, war, or terror’ (2003) 2003 Wisconsin LR 383, Wilde (2005) 772 and 
Steyn (2004) 1.  
475 Other consequences may be subjecton to interrogation procedures including serious ill-treatment or 
even amounting to torture, deportation or forfeiture of assets. 
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are put beyond domestic and international law, whereas the state is not bound by law 
anymore: this creates the ‘legal blackholes’ referred to. 
 
The justification for the new exception is rooted in the paradigm of the ‘war on 
terror’. The situation created by post-9/11 terrorism is deemed to pose such an 
exceptional threat that it amounts to a warlike state of emergency. In the face of this 
emergency, upholding everyone’s basic rights is seen as luxury which cannot be 
afforded. Instead individual rights in concrete cases are trumped by alleged necessities 
to pursue the abstract goal of national security.  
The justification follows the logic of the right to derogate from obligations in 
human rights treaties, according to which states may suspend obligations to avert their 
demise or serious harm to the public during emergencies. The ‘legal blackhole’ 
approach, however, differs from permissible derogation insofar as it is not subject to 
limitations. Lack of limitations is especially striking with a view to temporal limits: the 
nature of the ‘war on terrorism’ is inherently indefinite, turning the state of emergency 
into a permanent situation, which was called the ‘new normal’.476
 
4.3. Other states’ reactions 
As demonstrated above, a number of states copied US detention practices and 
justifications and, therefore, contributed actively to support the new rule. To establish 
whether there is a tendency towards general acceptance of the rule, reactions of states 
not engaging in the practice need to be examined: are other states objecting, showing 
indifference or even support?477
 
In general, states displayed overwhelming general support for the USA following 
9/11.478 The ‘war on terrorism’ was widely accepted to constitute a major feature of 
the contemporary international situation. The means employed to fight this ‘war’, 
however, differ. 
                                                 
476 Didion ‘Politics in the “new normal”America’ (2004) 51 New York Review of Books no 16, 21 
October 2004 and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) i. 
477 Cf Roberts (2004) 730. 




The practice of detention without trial has not provoked an outcry in other states. 
Instead, states voiced modest criticism calling for adherence to minimum standards of 
international law.479 France, for example, reiterated its view that detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay should be treated in accordance with international law without 
referring particularly to the practice of indefinite detention.480 The British Prime 
Minister Blair emphasized that trials of these detainees should comply with 
international law, but he did not criticize the detentions as such.481 While most state 
criticism was directed at the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, states did not condemn 
such detentions in general, for example by UN General Assembly resolution.482 An 
exception is Cuba which called US detention centers at Guantanamo Bay 
‘concentration camps’483 where detainees are held ‘in the worst style of the Middle 
Ages’.484 Cuba is, however, itself not a champion of human rights and the comments 
were rooted in its long standing hostility with the USA rather than in Cuba’s human 
rights concerns.485
 
Commentators explained the lack of forthright objection to the detention practices 
with pragmatic political reasons, according to which states might have an adverse legal 
belief, but feared retribution by the USA.486 This argumentation may also be turned 
upside down: states acquiesce broadly, because they share the legal belief in the new 
rule or are indifferent. Modest criticism is then raised from time to time to please 
                                                 
479 See Roberts (2004) 731-32.  
480 Roberts (2004) 731-32. 
481 408 Parliamentary Debate, HC (6th series) (2003) 1151-52. 
482 Roberts (2004) 732. 
483 Study of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (2004) UN Doc A/59/428 para 11. See also ‘Cuba 
calls Guantanamo “concentration camp”’ USA Today 27 December 2003, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-12-27-guantanamo_x.htm (accessed on 8 February 2006). 
484 UN Doc A/59/428 para 11. In addition, Cuba’s leader Fidel Castro announced that Cuba did not cash 
the cheques for the Guantanamo Bay lease anymore. See ‘Cuba decries detainees’ treatment’ BBC News 
27 December 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3350649.stm (accessed on 8 
February 2006). 
485 See UN Doc A/59/428 para 11 where Cuba stated that ‘ultrareactionary, militarist and fascist circles 
working with the Government of the United States have manipulated the expression of international 
solidarity with the people of the United States to try to impose a hegemonic dictatorship of global 
reach.’  
486 Roberts (2004) 732. 
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domestic electorate audiences critical of the US approach. One way or another, 
substantial objections raised by states in the international arena are not visible.  
 
Some European states showed implicit support for administrative detention of 
terrorist suspects when they sent interrogators to Guantanamo Bay. Germany sent 
investigators of its secret services to the military camp to interrogate inmates.487 The 
interrogations were justified by the government on grounds of preventing terrorist 
attacks in Germany, although it was admitted that information gathered there could not 
be used in court.488 France also sent interrogators to Guantanamo Bay to gather 
evidence that could be used in French courts against Guantanamo Bay detainees of 
French nationality.489 Belgium also sent judicial and police officers to interrogate 
detainees in connection with a domestic investigation in Belgium.490
  
States were also reluctant to exercise their right of diplomatic protection for 
detainees of their nationality.491 A survey by the Council of Europe revealed that from 
seven European countries with nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, only Denmark 
pushed emphatically for diplomatic protection of its citizen, ‘emphasising that his 
indefinite detention was unacceptable’.492 The other countries, however, requested 
access to their citizens and, partially, their return, but did not increase their efforts in 
case of denial.493 Australia did not even demand the return of its citizens, but instead 
                                                 
487 ‘Schäuble nennt neue Details: BKA verhörte Deutschen in syrischem Foltergefängnis’ Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung 15 December 2005, available at 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/,tt3m2/deutschland/artikel/244/66178/ (accessed on 10 february 2006). 
488 ‘Koalition verteidigt Vernehmung Gefangener in Guantanamo’ Financial Times Deutschland 15 
December 2005, available at http://www.ftd.de/pw/de/34915.html (accessed on 10 February 2006). 
489 Priest ‘Help from France key in covert operations: Paris’s “Alliance Base” targets terrorists’ 
Washington Post 3 July 2005 A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361.html (accessed on 10 February 2006). 
490 Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly Report: 
Lawfulness of detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay (2005) Doc 10497 app III para 2. 
491 Roberts (2004) 732. 
492 The Danish citizen was released in February 2004. Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights (2005) app III paras 1 and 5. 
493 These countries include Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, France, Sweden, Russia and the UK. Spain 
only requested access. Germany denied responsibility, because the detainee was only habitual resident 
in Germany, but had Turkish nationality. See Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights (2005) app III. 
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embraced the US approach of trying them before military tribunals at Guantanamo 
Bay.494  
 
According to the reactions of governments, the inter-state world seems 
surprisingly undivided on the critical issue of detention without trial and terrorism. 
Most states acquiesced, implicitly supported, embraced or even copied the post-9/11 
model advanced by the USA. The lack of opposition voiced by other executives can 
arguably be attributed to congruent interests: why should other executives oppose a 
practice they can copy to equally enhance their powers?495  
 
Furthermore, international human rights are structured in a way that states are only 
right bearers, whereas individuals are right holders. Unlike in other matters of 
international law, where states are both bearing and holding rights, states suffer no 
direct harm when human rights are violated by others.496 While states have a bigger 
interest in compliance with international humanitarian law since it affects soldiers as 
their agents, the ‘unlawful/enemy combatant’ approach is directed against non-state 
actors and not regular soldiers. 
 
4.4. The intra-state division: executive v judiciary 
The executive is, however, not the only branch of state that is significant to the 
process of international customary law. The judiciary is also relevant to this process, 
especially with regard to opinio iuris, because its domestic decisions epitomise the 
valid interpretation of what the law is in the state. With respect to the process of 
international customary law, the judiciary is, however, in a disadvantaged position, 
                                                 
494Attorney General Philip Ruddock and Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer ‘Government 
accepts military commissions for Guantanamo Bay detainees’ Joint news release 25 November 2003, 
available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/ministerruddockhome.nsf/Page/C8E45854478FB7E0CA256DE90018E
D4D?OpenDocument (accessed on 10 february 2006). See also ‘Howard rules out retrospective 
terrorism laws’ Sydney Morning Herald 23 February 2003, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/22/1077384621312.html?from=storyrhs (accessed on 10 
February 2006) and Roberts (2004) 732. 
495 Roberts (2004) 735. Cf also Thomas (2003) 1206-07 and Warbrick (2004) 1004 
496 Although human rights are owed erga omnes, violations hit the individual in the first place and states 
are much more reluctant to raise their voice than in cases involving state rights like territorial integrity. 
See ch 4.1. above. 
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since it can only react to the actions of the executive, which is always one or more 
steps ahead.  
 
Historically, courts tended to defer to the executive’s actions and decisions in 
situations of emergency. The ‘judicial tradition of deference’497 was especially 
apparent in times of war or when the state faced the threat of terrorism.498  
A complete assessment of the contemporary role of the judiciary in the ‘war on 
terrorism’ is, however, not yet possible. Judicial control of governmental action is 
usually triggered by individuals suing the state. Not only does the procedure of filing 
complaints take time, but also the process until judgment is rendered. Additionally, it 
may take years until litigants went through all appeal procedures and a case is 
ultimately decided by the highest court.499 Although post-9/11 emergency measures 
are now in force only around four years the longest, several cases were decided that 
reveal at least a trend: the judiciary is taking on an increasingly active role in 
opposition to the executive.500
 
The most resolute position was taken by the British House of Lords in A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.501 The House of Lords decided that the 
government’s indefinite detention of non-citizens and the underlying anti-terrorism 
law were in breach of the UK’s obligations under international human rights law, 
namely the EuCHR and the ICCPR. The UK’s administrative detention of terrorist 
suspects was found to be unnecessary and disproportionate. Furthermore, the 
limitation of detention to non-citizens was found to be discriminatory and therefore 
violating international human rights. In consequence, the judgment compelled the UK 
                                                 
497 Shapiro ‘The role of the courts in the war against terrorism: a preliminary assessment’ (2005) 29 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 105.  
498 See Benvenisti ‘National courts and the “war on terrorism”’ in Bianchi Enforcing international law 
against terrorism (2004) 308-25 and Rehnquist All the laws but one: civil liberties in wartime (1998) 4.  
499 Yin ‘The role of article III courts in the war on terrorism’ (2004-2005) 13 William & Mary Bill of 
Rights J 1046-47.  
500 Roberts (2004) 735. 
501 See ch 3.2.3. above. 
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government to modify its antiterrorism approach. Parliament subsequently repealed the 
norms authorizing indefinite detention and the administration released the detainees.502
 
The US Supreme Court rendered two important judgments in Rasul and Hamdi,503 
although it did not go as far as the British court. In Rasul, the Supreme Court upheld 
the government’s claim to detain indefinitely and deny POW status to what it called 
‘unlawful combatants’. The court, however, rejected the government’s claim that the 
‘unlawful combatants’ were not entitled to judicial review of the merits of their 
detention before US courts, because they lack jurisdiction. Instead, it confirmed the 
availability of habeas corpus to the detainees.  
 
The case of Hamdi concerned the rights of a US national who was designated an 
‘enemy combatant’ and detained without trial by the administration. The court held in 
a plurality opinion that US citizens may be detained as ‘enemy combatants’ under the 
congressional authorisation to use military force in the ‘war on terrorism’, but that 
detainees must be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of 
detention before a neutral decision maker. However, Hamdi was released and deported 
after he entered into an agreement with the government. 
 
Judicial bodies of states which did not themselves resort to detention without trial 
also expressed serious concerns. The English and Wales Court of Appeals was called 
on to rule on the Secretary of State’s duty of diplomatic protection towards a UK 
national detained at Guantanamo Bay.504 While the court rejected the application, it 
found that detentions at Guantanamo Bay were objectionable.505 Detainees were 
arbitrarily detained in a legal black hole which was in apparent contravention of 
                                                 
502 See ch 3.2.3. above. 
503 See ch 3.1.4. above. 
504 Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2002) EWCA Civ 1598 para 1. 
See also Benvenisti (2004) 328 and Roberts (2004) 735. 
505 Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth (2002) EWCA Civ 1598 para 66. 
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fundamental principles of international law.506 The court further expressed hope that 
the US Supreme Court would take notice of its opinion.507
 
In Malawi, the High Court of Blantyre issued an injunction prohibiting the transfer 
into US custody of five terrorist suspects arrested by Malawi’s National Intelligence 
Bureau in cooperation with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).508 The High 
Court ordered that the suspects be produced before it within 48 hours and released on 
bail or informed of the charges against them.509 Nevertheless, they were transferred to 
US custody.510 The detainees were released in Sudan five weeks later following 
clearance of their alleged connections to Al Qaeda by US authorities and the Malawian 
President apologised to them.511
 
In October 2001, Bosnian authorities arrested six Algerian men alleged to have 
links to Al Qaeda.512 After four months, the Bosnian Supreme Court ordered their 
release because there was lack of evidence against them.513 Despite this judicial order 
the suspects were surrendered to US troops in Bosnia.514 In reaction, the Human 
Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an injunction that the suspects stay 
                                                 
506 Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth (2002) EWCA Civ 1598 paras 64 and 
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508 International Commission of Jurists ‘US and Malawi: rule of law compromised in fight against 
terrorism’ Communique de Presse, 27 June 2003, available at 
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in the country for further proceedings.515 The injunction was again ignored and the 
suspects transferred to Guantanamo Bay.516 One Supreme Court judge denounced the 
transfer as ‘extra legal procedure’,517 whereas the Human Rights Chamber complained 
that the ignorance of its binding decision caused irreparable harm.518 Furthermore, the 
Bosnian Human Rights Chamber held that the Bosnian government violated the 
EuCHR’s prohibition of arbitrary detention.519  
 
Some courts, for example in Canada,520 upheld the government’s claims 
completely. Nevertheless, there is a trend to scrutinize and condemn executive action, 
which creates growing tension between the executive as primary actor and the 
judiciary as its watchdog.521 While the inter-state world is not divided with respect to 
detention without trial of terrorists after 9/11, an intra-state division between 
governments and courts is emerging. The executive did, however, not always back 
down to courts’ judgments, but acted in contradiction to the judicial rulings.522 In such 
cases the court decisions did not end the suspects’ discontent as the executive failed to 
follow the courts’ determination. 
  
 
The differing attitudes between these two branches of state raise the question of 
who speaks for the state in the international law arena. It is mainly the executive who 
engages in state practice since it generally has the prerogative in international relations 
and foreign policy. The judiciary, however, determines what the law is and thus is the 
ultimate source of opinio iuris. What the courts did was to declare that the practice of 
detention without trial was in breach of existing domestic and international law. This 
                                                 
515 The Human Rights Chamber was established in the Dayton Accords and is closely modeled on the 
EurCtHR. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 14 December 1995, 
35 ILM 89. See also Cornell and Salisbury ‘The importance of civil law in the transition to peace: 
lessons from the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2001-2002) 35 Cornell 
International LJ 397. 
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declaration of illegality deleted the potential to contribute to the creation of a new rule, 
because it stripped the practice of the sine qua non of accompanying opinio iuris.523  
 
4.5. International organisations 
Detention practices were criticised with determination and steadiness by 
international organisations, especially their human rights organs.524 The UN Human 
Rights Committee bemoaned the frequent use of administrative detention in Israel525 
and the adoption of anti-terrorism legislation authorizing administrative detention in 
Colombia and Sri Lanka.526 The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its 
annual report of 2004 disapproved of the fact that legal safeguards concerning 
detainees are observed only insofar as they are consistent with military security in a 
growing number of cases.527 The Working Group also stipulated that the right to 
challenge detention may not be abrogated in any circumstances, whether conflict, war 
or state of exception.528 Furthermore, the Working Group criticised detention without 
trial at Guantanamo Bay for its apparent lack of legal basis for the deprivation of 
liberty.529 This critique was rejected by the US government with reference to the 
Working Group’s lack of competence in areas relating to international humanitarian 
law.530
 
Only two months after detentions at Guantanamo Bay commenced, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights requested preliminary measures to have the 
                                                 
523 See ch 4.1. above. 
524 See for example the annual reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 2003-2005, UN 
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legal status of detainees determined by a competent tribunal and demanded that they 
should be granted legal protection according to their respective status.531 The USA 
brushed off the request with reference to the Inter-American Commission’s lack of 
jurisdiction in the matter.532 No further action followed. 
 
The Council of Europe’s committee of ministers adopted guidelines on human 
rights and the fight against terrorism in July 2002, which emphasize the absolute 
necessity of respecting human rights, the rule of law and humanitarian law in the fight 
against terrorism.533 The council furthermore stipulated the absolute prohibition of 
arbitrariness and discriminatory nature of any measures and reiterated minimum 
standards for the deprivation of liberty including the right to prompt judicial review.534 
On the one hand the guidelines may provide an authoritative statement of the European 
position on human rights and anti-terrorism, since they were adopted by the 
representatives of the member states.535 Thus, they constitute a collective statement of 
the single member states.536 On the other hand, the guidelines may be interpreted as a 
mere political statement, because they are not legally binding.537 In addition, European 
state practice did not always follow the statements, thus diluting possible legal 
consequences.538
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4.6. Towards a new rule? – Effects of the detention practices in international 
law 
A new rule of international law, which creates an exception to the prohibition of 
detention without trial, does not yet exist. Strong evidence for such a new rule would 
be needed, because the prohibition of detention without trial is firmly rooted in 
numerous multilateral treaties and international custom of human rights and 
humanitarian law. In light of this, the time span of approximately five years was too 
short to proof convincingly the emergence of the new rule.539
 
This does not, however, mean that nothing has changed since. The prohibition of 
detention without trial has been violated in numerous cases in order to fight terrorism 
and the question about the legal impact of these violations remains: are the violations 
paving the way towards a new rule or are they mere breaches of existing international 
law? 
 
Support for the contention that we are heading towards an anti-terrorism exception 
to the prohibition of detention without trial can be found in state activities and their 
justifications. The state directly affected by 9/11, which also happens to be the world’s 
single superpower, led the way in changing the norm. The USA started to detain 
terrorist suspects without trial for an indefinite period of time and without any 
involvement of the judiciary. Despite the prohibition of such conduct in international 
law, the USA asserted the right to do so and justified it on grounds of national security 
and a completely different situation of emergency, which happened to be permanent by 
nature. The violation can be interpreted as a proposal to alter existing rules of 
international law.540
 
Numerous governments from different world regions copied the US approach and 
introduced legislation permitting detention of terrorist suspects at the executive’s 
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whim.541 By doing so they accepted the proposal to alter the rules. This interpretation 
is bolstered by the fact, that these governments availed themselves of the US 
justifications and also adopted the US belief of legal entitlement.  
 
It is not necessary for the establishment of a new rule of international customary 
law to be practiced by the majority of states.542 General support can also be drawn 
from other activities showing implicit consent, as in the case of the despatch of 
interrogators to Guantanamo Bay.543 It is even sufficient that only a minority engages 
in the usage and the majority keeps silent and approves the usage through 
acquiescence. 
 
In fact, hardly any state expressed fervent and repeated objection in the case of 
post-9/11 detention without trial.544 From the perspective of governments, the world 
shared a surprisingly undivided view on the administrative detention of terrorist 
suspects. No larger debate evolved around the detention practices on an inter-state 
level.  
 
The struggle has instead shifted to the domestic level, where courts ruled against 
executive detention practices and norms.545 The British House of Lords found 
indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects in breach of international human rights 
law and attained the repeal of the underlying legal provisions.546 The US Supreme 
Court did, however, not render such a bold judgment. It upheld the administration’s 
wartime power to detain ‘unlawful combatants’, but opened the American court 
system to habeas corpus review of the merits of such detention. Thereby, the Supreme 
Court rejected the administration’s claim of unfettered and unreviewable power to 
detain. With more litigation to come, executives are likely to face growing opposition 
from the judicial branch. 
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The growing opposition of domestic courts towards administrative detention of 
terrorist suspects slowed down the movement towards a new customary rule 
significantly, if not bringing it to a halt altogether. The court decisions delegitimised 
the executives’ claims and stripped detention practices of the complementing opinio 
iuris, at least partially. Accordingly, the claims lost their legal significance and should 
be regarded as mere breaches of existing rules. 
 
Nevertheless, the potential to move towards a new rule is still there. In case of 
another terrorist attack of the scale of 9/11, governmental reactions with harsh 
consequences for human rights are likely, pushing towards detention without trial with 
verve. The occurrence of another major terrorist attack will probably also resurrect 
judicial deference towards the executive.  
While some states resorted to indefinite administrative detention, others limited 
the time period of detention. The frequent use of unlimited or long term detention by 
some countries has a psychological effect. In light of the more extreme measure of 
indefinite detention, the use of detention without trial for shorter periods looks less 
grave. Admittedly, the author of this thesis experienced this effect himself in the 
writing process.  
 
This psychological effect is likely to facilitate the extension of the time limits of 
reasonable detention. The pre-9/11 standard of acceptable and reasonable 
administrative detention did not expand further than a few days. Moreover, the trend 
was pointing to a restriction of a maximum of 48 hours detention without judicial 
scrutiny. Compared to the indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay, detention without 
trial for some weeks seems rather mild, although this was clearly prohibited before 
9/11.  
 




It was suggested that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 created a permanent ‘new 
normalcy’,547 according to which the relation of state security and individual rights 
had to be readjusted.548 This readjustment followed a ‘Machiavellian logic of ends 
justifying means, of rights subordinated to security’.549 Counterterrorism means 
included the ‘crown jewel of emergency measures’:550 administrative detention 
without trial.  
 
State practice and opinio iuris displayed by governments supported the contention 
that a ‘new world’551 with regard to individual rights was about to develop. In this 
development, old rules prohibiting detention without trial were contested by the 
actions of numerous governments. Their actions could potentially have modified old 
rules by way of norm changing through the process of international customary law. 
 
However, a division within domestic legal systems emerged with time passing by. 
The judiciary increasingly objected to the executive’s approach to detain terrorist 
suspects at will. Domestic courts started to refill the ‘legal blackholes’ dug by the 
executive. While the further development will, however, depend on external factors 
like the occurrence of terrorist attacks comparable to 9/11, a norm change has not been 
effected and a potential development towards change has been halted.  
 
This trend is bolstered by recent developments. In February 2006 five independent 
experts552 of the UN Commission on Human Rights issued a report bashing the 
detentions at Guantanamo Bay.553 The experts expressly demanded the immediate 
                                                 
547 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2003) i. 
548 Didion (2004). 
549 Freeman and Van Ert (2004) 519-20. 
550 Hor (2005) 277. 
551 Weisselberg (2005) 
552 These include Leila Zerrougui (Chairman Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention), 
Leandro Despouy, (Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers), Manfred Nowak, 
(Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Asma 
Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief) and Paul Hunt (the Special Rapporteur on 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health).  




shutdown of the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.554 Furthermore, all detainees 
should either be released without further delay or tried expeditiously under criminal 
procedure.555 Although the report has no legal significance, other states’ reactions 
thereto indicated that detention without trial as counterterrorism measure is 
increasingly discredited and the US approach considered a breach of existing law.556 
The calls for immediate closure were reiterated by the British and the German 
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